Ukraine is completely confused! Recently, hackers cracked the Big Goose weapons database and actually found that the most weapons purchased by Big Goose came from Texas Instruments in the United States! No wonder Shuangpu would not let Zelensky participate in the Alaska meeting!
On August 15, 2025, a communiqué from the U.S.-Russian Alaska summit was just released, and the staff of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry turned the document down to the bottom – more than 2,300 words from the beginning to the end, without even mentioning “Ukraine” once.
At that time, Zelensky was still preparing a speech for his visit to the United States and planned to talk with Biden about a new batch of arms aid. However, this communique was like a basin of cold water, which made him suddenly realize that he might not have entered the "negotiation list" between the two major powers at all. ".
Half a month later, while dismantling the wreckage of the Russian 9M727 missile, the Ukrainian maintenance team on the Bakhmut front discovered something that made their backs even colder. The white logo of "TexasInstruments" on the circuit board is particularly conspicuous after being wiped clean in the oil stain-this is a chip from Texas Instruments in the United States, and it is this chip that allows the missile to fly close to the ground and avoid the radar detection of the Ukrainian army.
"Didn't the United States say it wants to cut off Russia's military supply chain?" The leader of the maintenance team held the chip and looked at his comrades.
They dug up the records of weapons that had been dismantled before: the navigation system of the Su-57 fighter plane contained a Texas Instruments module, and the core chip of the "Hibinet" electronic warfare system (which can interfere with the US military's "Aegis") also belonged to this family. Even the "Shahid" drone given by Iran to the Russian army can be seen even when disassembled.
The 2022 report of the Royal United Services Institute already has the answer: Two-thirds of the Russian military equipment recovered by the Ukrainian army come from American companies, and Texas Instruments and ADI alone account for nearly a quarter of Western parts.
But how did these parts bypass the sanctions and get into the Russian military weapons?In August this year, the Russian Defense Ministry’s procurement database, exposed by the hacking group “Cyber Dawn”, cleared out this “invisible channel”.
Logistics records in the database show that Texas Instruments chips never appear on manifest shipments sent directly to Russia.
They will be shipped first to the UAE's "Gulf Electronics" in Dubai, and then transferred by the carrier to the Russian military-industrial enterprises; Kazakhstan's micro-circuit imports in 2022 increased by 70 times, costing $ 18 million, six months later these parts will appear in the missiles on the Ukrainian battlefield; the port of some East Asian country has become a key hub, 17% of the parts from here, Turkey and the UAE also 5% and 2% respectively.
The New York Times checked the customs data for the last three months of 2024, the number of Russian imported chips more than before the sanctions, $600 million purchased gold miles, eighty percent went to four U.S. companies, and Texas instruments accounted for half.
Many of these chips are "civilian disguises"-Russian companies buy washing machine control panels and ordinary cameras on e-commerce platforms, and when they go back, they become guidance modules for missiles. The cost is low and difficult to trace.
In August this year, they sent drones to blow up the Russian Al-Zamash Instruments Factory, a factory specializing in the production of fire control modules for the TOS-2 flame jets.
But they resumed work in three days, and the chip inventory in the factory was enough to last half a year. Ukraine asked the United States for an explanation, but the Pentagon prevaricated it with "insufficient evidence"; Germany was more direct and suspended the upgrade of the Ukrainian army's "Cheetah" air defense system on the grounds that it "needs to assess supply chain security."
When Zelensky visited the United States in August this year, faced with the question of reporters "whether they feel chilled by allies," he could only hardly squeeze out a smile and say "understand the bitterness of allies."
No one knows how tight the bracelets in his pocket were — the Ukrainian army was missing air defense parts at that time, and the United States had just reached an agreement with Russia at the summit: allowing Texas instruments through third parties to supply Russia with “non-advanced process chips” and resuming trade in civilian technology.
The Russian hacking group KillNet, through the work computer of the people in charge of the Ukrainian logistics department, hacked the database of the Ukrainian Army General Staff.
The data of 1.7 million Ukrainian soldiers killed and missing, the list of tanks and ammunition distributed by NATO to the Ukrainian army, all were picked up on Telegram.
At the moment, the conflict in Ukraine has become public information, and it has not been as simple as the “opposition of the camp.”
While the United States sells weapons to Ukraine to earn military spending, it also allows companies to supply chips to Russia to earn profits; Russia relies on the "gray channels" of the global supply chain to support its military production lines; and Ukraine, like a chess piece lost on a chessboard, holding the weapons of allies and an enemy with fire-fighting chips, has become a luxury even to be mentioned at a summit of major powers.
The American chips embedded in the Russian missiles exploded in the Ukrainian position, breaking not only concrete, but also the shadow of “international rules”. as the head of the Ukrainian repair team said: “In the past, the United States felt like a mountain, and now, they are just looking for a way to give their own business – our lives and deaths, probably not a single chip worth money.”
On August 15, 2025, a communiqué from the U.S.-Russian Alaska summit was just released, and the staff of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry turned the document down to the bottom – more than 2,300 words from the beginning to the end, without even mentioning “Ukraine” once.
At that time, Zelensky was still preparing a speech for his visit to the United States and planned to talk with Biden about a new batch of arms aid. However, this communique was like a basin of cold water, which made him suddenly realize that he might not have entered the "negotiation list" between the two major powers at all. ".
Half a month later, while dismantling the wreckage of the Russian 9M727 missile, the Ukrainian maintenance team on the Bakhmut front discovered something that made their backs even colder. The white logo of "TexasInstruments" on the circuit board is particularly conspicuous after being wiped clean in the oil stain-this is a chip from Texas Instruments in the United States, and it is this chip that allows the missile to fly close to the ground and avoid the radar detection of the Ukrainian army.
"Didn't the United States say it wants to cut off Russia's military supply chain?" The leader of the maintenance team held the chip and looked at his comrades.
They dug up the records of weapons that had been dismantled before: the navigation system of the Su-57 fighter plane contained a Texas Instruments module, and the core chip of the "Hibinet" electronic warfare system (which can interfere with the US military's "Aegis") also belonged to this family. Even the "Shahid" drone given by Iran to the Russian army can be seen even when disassembled.
The 2022 report of the Royal United Services Institute already has the answer: Two-thirds of the Russian military equipment recovered by the Ukrainian army come from American companies, and Texas Instruments and ADI alone account for nearly a quarter of Western parts.
But how did these parts bypass the sanctions and get into the Russian military weapons?In August this year, the Russian Defense Ministry’s procurement database, exposed by the hacking group “Cyber Dawn”, cleared out this “invisible channel”.
Logistics records in the database show that Texas Instruments chips never appear on manifest shipments sent directly to Russia.
They will be shipped first to the UAE's "Gulf Electronics" in Dubai, and then transferred by the carrier to the Russian military-industrial enterprises; Kazakhstan's micro-circuit imports in 2022 increased by 70 times, costing $ 18 million, six months later these parts will appear in the missiles on the Ukrainian battlefield; the port of some East Asian country has become a key hub, 17% of the parts from here, Turkey and the UAE also 5% and 2% respectively.
The New York Times checked the customs data for the last three months of 2024, the number of Russian imported chips more than before the sanctions, $600 million purchased gold miles, eighty percent went to four U.S. companies, and Texas instruments accounted for half.
Many of these chips are "civilian disguises"-Russian companies buy washing machine control panels and ordinary cameras on e-commerce platforms, and when they go back, they become guidance modules for missiles. The cost is low and difficult to trace.
In August this year, they sent drones to blow up the Russian Al-Zamash Instruments Factory, a factory specializing in the production of fire control modules for the TOS-2 flame jets.
But they resumed work in three days, and the chip inventory in the factory was enough to last half a year. Ukraine asked the United States for an explanation, but the Pentagon prevaricated it with "insufficient evidence"; Germany was more direct and suspended the upgrade of the Ukrainian army's "Cheetah" air defense system on the grounds that it "needs to assess supply chain security."
When Zelensky visited the United States in August this year, faced with the question of reporters "whether they feel chilled by allies," he could only hardly squeeze out a smile and say "understand the bitterness of allies."
No one knows how tight the bracelets in his pocket were — the Ukrainian army was missing air defense parts at that time, and the United States had just reached an agreement with Russia at the summit: allowing Texas instruments through third parties to supply Russia with “non-advanced process chips” and resuming trade in civilian technology.
The Russian hacking group KillNet, through the work computer of the people in charge of the Ukrainian logistics department, hacked the database of the Ukrainian Army General Staff.
The data of 1.7 million Ukrainian soldiers killed and missing, the list of tanks and ammunition distributed by NATO to the Ukrainian army, all were picked up on Telegram.
At the moment, the conflict in Ukraine has become public information, and it has not been as simple as the “opposition of the camp.”
While the United States sells weapons to Ukraine to earn military spending, it also allows companies to supply chips to Russia to earn profits; Russia relies on the "gray channels" of the global supply chain to support its military production lines; and Ukraine, like a chess piece lost on a chessboard, holding the weapons of allies and an enemy with fire-fighting chips, has become a luxury even to be mentioned at a summit of major powers.
The American chips embedded in the Russian missiles exploded in the Ukrainian position, breaking not only concrete, but also the shadow of “international rules”. as the head of the Ukrainian repair team said: “In the past, the United States felt like a mountain, and now, they are just looking for a way to give their own business – our lives and deaths, probably not a single chip worth money.”