France announced: Send troops!
Germany to send troops!
Sweden announced: Send troops!
France, Germany and Sweden announced on the 29th that they would send military personnel and provide anti-drone equipment to Denmark to help strengthen security at the EU Leaders 'Informal Meeting and the European Political Community Leaders' Meeting held in Copenhagen this week.
Behind this seemingly routine security operation lies Europe's collective anxiety about the threat of drones, which reflects the difficult exploration of European defense autonomy in the context of the spillover of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. From the streets of Copenhagen to the Baltic coast, an "air offensive and defensive war" without smoke is unfolding.
Recent drone activity in Denmark has broken the conventional warning line.Since September 22, Copenhagen’s Kastrup International Airport has been forced to close for four hours due to unknown drone interference, and the airspace of Aalborg Airport has been paralyzed once.
More dangerously, the Danish military has discovered suspected military-grade drones above the Karup Air Force Base, with Turkish defense capabilities far exceeding those of civilian products. Swedish Prime Minister Christensen said: “These drones may carry explosives or electronic warfare equipment, which threatens the security of NATO member states.”
This threat has made Europe aware of the fragility of traditional defense systems. After the German frigate "Hamburg" arrived in Copenhagen, its "Sirius" infrared detection system scanned the airspace around the clock, but there were still detection blind spots in the face of small drones.
Although the "Little Fox" helicopter sent by France has anti-drone capabilities, it is only 2.5 hours in the air, and it is difficult to cover the entire territory of Denmark. Sweden's "SkyNet" anti-drone radar system can track targets within 30 kilometers, but the recognition rate for hidden drones is less than 40%.
This joint action among the three countries exposed the deep contradictions in European defense. Of the 40 soldiers sent by Germany, 20 were from the Bundeswehr Electronic Warfare Force, 10 were responsible for drone interception, and the rest needed to coordinate the deployment of the Danish military.
This "modular" mode of dispatch is in fact the advantage of countries with limited resources.Swedish borrowed high-performance radar systems need to work with German data chains, while French helicopter fuel supply relies on NATO logistics network, exposing the fragmentation of the European defense system.
The "European Drone Wall" plan recently proposed by the European Commission attempts to establish a defense line composed of anti-drone systems along the Baltic Sea coast. The plan plans to deploy 300 sets of "Sky Guard" laser interceptors to form an electromagnetic barrier covering 200 kilometers.
But the reality is that the EU can currently only produce 120 sets of similar equipment, and each set costs as high as 18 million euros. Germany's Rheinmetall admitted that its newly developed "Typhoon" anti-drone missile costs 470,000 euros each, while the Russian "Lancet" suicide drone costs only 30,000 US dollars.
This cost imbalance is unprecedented in Copenhagen security.The Danish military has deployed the “Iron Dome” air defense system, but its single-cost interceptor ammunition is 20 times the cost of drones.
Sweden's "drone killer" system, although it can paralyze targets through electromagnetic pulses, has a radius of only 5 kilometers and can not cope with cluster attacks.
Ironically, the Zeus Shield system of the German escort ship Hamburg misjudged civilian drones as threatening targets during exercises, exposing the fatal flaws of artificial intelligence algorithms.
The three countries 'sending troops implies a game between NATO and the European Union. German soldiers are part of NATO's Rapid Reaction Force and need to report their actions to Brussels; French helicopters are deployed by the EU's civil protection mechanism, highlighting the battle for command.
Although Poland did not directly send troops, it provided Denmark with 300 riot police equipment from General Dynamics of the United States, exposing the reliance of NATO's equipment supply chain on non-member states.
The deeper contradiction lies in differences in strategic goals. France hopes to promote EU defense autonomy through this action, and all the anti-drone systems it provides use European native technology.
Germany, on the other hand, tends to rely more on the NATO system, with its troops deployed using NATO unified communications equipment. Sweden’s ambiguity is representative – providing key radar technology and refusing to join NATO, a “wall strategy” that reflects the wisdom of small and medium-sized countries to survive.
During the 1948 Berlin blockade, the Soviet Union forced the West to surrender by cutting off air corridors; in Copenhagen in 2025, drones were becoming a new type of blockade tool.
The "Iskander" tactical missile system recently deployed by the Russian army in Kaliningrad has a range covering the entire territory of Denmark, and its cruise missiles can carry out "swarm attacks" on Copenhagen. Simulations by the Danish Ministry of Defense show that if the Russian army launches 200 drone attacks, the existing air defense system can only intercept 35%.
This threat has given rise to Europe's "distributed defense" concept.The EU plans to deploy mobile anti-drone positions in the Baltic three countries, each equipped with four "Skype" radars and six "Falcon" helicopters.
But the reality is that it will take the EU two years to complete the construction of the relevant facilities, while the Russian drone technology iteration cycle has been shortened to six months.Chicourland warns: “Europe is responding to the 21st-century threats with a Cold War mindset, and this time and space misplacement will pay a painful price.”
From the Mongolian cavalry's "arrow rain tactics" to today's drone swarms, the evolution of war forms has never stopped. The joint action of France, Germany and Switzerland is not only military assistance, but also a desperate counterattack against the old order. However, history has repeatedly proved that any attempt to solve political contradictions by technical violence will eventually pay a more painful price.
As Clausewitz put it in his Theory of War, “War is the continuation of politics, but when politics loses its bottom line, war devours everything.”
In this modern version of the "Air Canyon Battle", there are no real winners, only the more awake survivors.When the Copenhagen air defense alarm rings, the world should remember that peace is not a luxury, but the lowest line of defense for civilization to survive.
Source of information:
The three countries send military personnel to Denmark and provide anti-drone equipment to assist in security work
2025-09-30 13:24 New Yellow River
Germany to send troops!
Sweden announced: Send troops!
France, Germany and Sweden announced on the 29th that they would send military personnel and provide anti-drone equipment to Denmark to help strengthen security at the EU Leaders 'Informal Meeting and the European Political Community Leaders' Meeting held in Copenhagen this week.
Behind this seemingly routine security operation lies Europe's collective anxiety about the threat of drones, which reflects the difficult exploration of European defense autonomy in the context of the spillover of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. From the streets of Copenhagen to the Baltic coast, an "air offensive and defensive war" without smoke is unfolding.
Recent drone activity in Denmark has broken the conventional warning line.Since September 22, Copenhagen’s Kastrup International Airport has been forced to close for four hours due to unknown drone interference, and the airspace of Aalborg Airport has been paralyzed once.
More dangerously, the Danish military has discovered suspected military-grade drones above the Karup Air Force Base, with Turkish defense capabilities far exceeding those of civilian products. Swedish Prime Minister Christensen said: “These drones may carry explosives or electronic warfare equipment, which threatens the security of NATO member states.”
This threat has made Europe aware of the fragility of traditional defense systems. After the German frigate "Hamburg" arrived in Copenhagen, its "Sirius" infrared detection system scanned the airspace around the clock, but there were still detection blind spots in the face of small drones.
Although the "Little Fox" helicopter sent by France has anti-drone capabilities, it is only 2.5 hours in the air, and it is difficult to cover the entire territory of Denmark. Sweden's "SkyNet" anti-drone radar system can track targets within 30 kilometers, but the recognition rate for hidden drones is less than 40%.
This joint action among the three countries exposed the deep contradictions in European defense. Of the 40 soldiers sent by Germany, 20 were from the Bundeswehr Electronic Warfare Force, 10 were responsible for drone interception, and the rest needed to coordinate the deployment of the Danish military.
This "modular" mode of dispatch is in fact the advantage of countries with limited resources.Swedish borrowed high-performance radar systems need to work with German data chains, while French helicopter fuel supply relies on NATO logistics network, exposing the fragmentation of the European defense system.
The "European Drone Wall" plan recently proposed by the European Commission attempts to establish a defense line composed of anti-drone systems along the Baltic Sea coast. The plan plans to deploy 300 sets of "Sky Guard" laser interceptors to form an electromagnetic barrier covering 200 kilometers.
But the reality is that the EU can currently only produce 120 sets of similar equipment, and each set costs as high as 18 million euros. Germany's Rheinmetall admitted that its newly developed "Typhoon" anti-drone missile costs 470,000 euros each, while the Russian "Lancet" suicide drone costs only 30,000 US dollars.
This cost imbalance is unprecedented in Copenhagen security.The Danish military has deployed the “Iron Dome” air defense system, but its single-cost interceptor ammunition is 20 times the cost of drones.
Sweden's "drone killer" system, although it can paralyze targets through electromagnetic pulses, has a radius of only 5 kilometers and can not cope with cluster attacks.
Ironically, the Zeus Shield system of the German escort ship Hamburg misjudged civilian drones as threatening targets during exercises, exposing the fatal flaws of artificial intelligence algorithms.
The three countries 'sending troops implies a game between NATO and the European Union. German soldiers are part of NATO's Rapid Reaction Force and need to report their actions to Brussels; French helicopters are deployed by the EU's civil protection mechanism, highlighting the battle for command.
Although Poland did not directly send troops, it provided Denmark with 300 riot police equipment from General Dynamics of the United States, exposing the reliance of NATO's equipment supply chain on non-member states.
The deeper contradiction lies in differences in strategic goals. France hopes to promote EU defense autonomy through this action, and all the anti-drone systems it provides use European native technology.
Germany, on the other hand, tends to rely more on the NATO system, with its troops deployed using NATO unified communications equipment. Sweden’s ambiguity is representative – providing key radar technology and refusing to join NATO, a “wall strategy” that reflects the wisdom of small and medium-sized countries to survive.
During the 1948 Berlin blockade, the Soviet Union forced the West to surrender by cutting off air corridors; in Copenhagen in 2025, drones were becoming a new type of blockade tool.
The "Iskander" tactical missile system recently deployed by the Russian army in Kaliningrad has a range covering the entire territory of Denmark, and its cruise missiles can carry out "swarm attacks" on Copenhagen. Simulations by the Danish Ministry of Defense show that if the Russian army launches 200 drone attacks, the existing air defense system can only intercept 35%.
This threat has given rise to Europe's "distributed defense" concept.The EU plans to deploy mobile anti-drone positions in the Baltic three countries, each equipped with four "Skype" radars and six "Falcon" helicopters.
But the reality is that it will take the EU two years to complete the construction of the relevant facilities, while the Russian drone technology iteration cycle has been shortened to six months.Chicourland warns: “Europe is responding to the 21st-century threats with a Cold War mindset, and this time and space misplacement will pay a painful price.”
From the Mongolian cavalry's "arrow rain tactics" to today's drone swarms, the evolution of war forms has never stopped. The joint action of France, Germany and Switzerland is not only military assistance, but also a desperate counterattack against the old order. However, history has repeatedly proved that any attempt to solve political contradictions by technical violence will eventually pay a more painful price.
As Clausewitz put it in his Theory of War, “War is the continuation of politics, but when politics loses its bottom line, war devours everything.”
In this modern version of the "Air Canyon Battle", there are no real winners, only the more awake survivors.When the Copenhagen air defense alarm rings, the world should remember that peace is not a luxury, but the lowest line of defense for civilization to survive.
Source of information:
The three countries send military personnel to Denmark and provide anti-drone equipment to assist in security work
2025-09-30 13:24 New Yellow River