Press Release
A major Eastern power has blocked all the operational space of the U.S. side in the "non-support" and left the decision-making power to the U.S. side, how the choice will affect peace in Taiwan and China-US relations.
In September 2025, a major Eastern country negotiating representative at a closed-door meeting asked the United States to make a formal “opposition” statement on sensitive issues, instead of continuing its previous “no support” statements.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "no support" is a political expression, does not generate legal binding effect, and reserves policy reversal space; while "opposition" constitutes an "opposition opinion" in the sense of international law, which may trigger a dispute resolution mechanism.
What is more subtle is the difference at the execution level. "Non-support" is often accompanied by technical cooperation and intelligence sharing. For example, although the United States publicly states that it does not support arms sales to a certain region, it continues to provide satellite reconnaissance data; The "opposition" must cut off substantive assistance, otherwise it will constitute a diplomatic dishonesty of "inconsistent words and deeds". This ambiguous strategy of duplicity is becoming the focus of attack.
The "strategic ambiguity" policy of the United States can be traced back to Nixon's visit to China in 1972. At that time, in order to maintain cross-strait relations, the United States creatively used the expression "recognition but not recognition".
After the Cold War, this policy extended to global hotspots, such as “no support but understanding” for Kosovo’s independence and “no recognition but acceptance of reality” for the Crimea issue.
But the Crimean crisis in 2014 became a turning point. Obama's weak response of "not supporting force to change the status quo" was regarded as acquiescence by Russia. Since then, the eastern powers have learned from it and realized that vague policies may be interpreted as connivance, so they began to promote clear statements.
U.S. allies differ on ambiguous policy positions. Japan advocates strengthening “opposition” expressions to deter potential conflict, while Australia is concerned about over-stimulating opponents, and Germany is more inclined to maintain the status quo. This disagreement makes it difficult for the United States to form a unified front. The 2024 internal NATO meeting records show that European member states oppose the percentage of “no support” to “opposition” up to 68%.
More difficult is the economic bondage.The German automotive industry, the French aviation industry in the great market interests of the Eastern great powers, not willing to lose commercial interests because of the clear election side.
The eastern powers demand that the United States escalate its position and skillfully use the tools of international law. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the threat of force, but the statement of "not supporting" can hardly constitute an opposition in the legal sense. If the United States explicitly "opposes", it needs to undertake the obligation to "stop illegal acts", otherwise it may face international litigation.
What is more far-reaching is the struggle for the right to make rules. The eastern powers are pushing for the revision of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning the Establishment of Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, demanding that the clause of "no support means acquiescence" be clarified. This kind of rule war puts the United States in a dilemma.
The U.S. internal affairs are complicated. Republican hardships demand clear “opposition,” Democratic liberals advocate to maintain the status quo, military-industrial complexes are pleased with tensions to obtain orders, and Silicon Valley technology companies worry about market losses.
More directly is the election consideration, the mid-term elections in 2026 in which the policy towards China becomes the focus. Excessively hard may lose the middle voters, too weak and criticized.
The development of military science and technology has changed strategic calculations.The high-speed missiles of the Eastern powers break through traditional defense, electromagnetic artillery technology matures, and artificial intelligence command systems shorten decision-making time.These asymmetrical combat forces have reduced the U.S. "vague deterrent" effect.
More crucial is the nuclear situation.The modernization of the nuclear arsenal of the Eastern powers is beyond expectation, and the intercontinental missiles tested in 2024 can cover the United States.This secondary strike capability weakens the U.S. extended deterrent credibility and compels to re-evaluate policy.
The eastern powers adopt "encirclement diplomacy" to exert pressure. Promote the joint statement at the SCO summit, win support at the ASEAN Regional Forum, and organize thematic debates at the UN General Assembly. This kind of multilateral containment has enhanced the sense of isolation of the United States.
More effective is the "connection of topics". linking the issues of expression to global issues such as climate cooperation, anti-epidemic aid, financial stability.
The fourth quarter of 2025 will be marked by a number of decision-making phases: the UN General Assembly debate, the APEC Leaders’ Meeting, and the NATO Summit.
What's more critical is the military node. The United States plans to deploy new medium-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region in early 2026, and the eastern powers announced that they would conduct anti-missile tests at the same time. This escalation of confrontation may force both sides to show their cards in advance.
The eastern powers pursue the escalation of their attitudes, but avoid over-stimulation. Demand "opposition" instead of "condemnation", leaving room; Focus on specific issues rather than comprehensive confrontation, and control the scope; Speak through diplomatic channels rather than the media to reduce the pressure of public opinion.
The United States also needs steps, and may take a "step by step" strategy: first by the think tank, then let the allies respond, and finally officially confirm.
The strategic tradition of the Eastern great powers emphasizes "righteousness" and believes that vague expressions promote risks. American pragmatism values "strategic vague" operating space. This cultural difference leads to opposite interpretations of the same policy.
The word dispute from "not supporting" to "opposing" is actually a struggle for the dominance of the international order. When strategic ambiguity cannot maintain the balance of interests, big countries must face the historical moment of clear side selection. This change brings not only the adjustment of diplomatic rhetoric, but also the reshaping of the global power structure.
The choice that the United States faces is essentially the balance between hegemony and risk control, and the escalation of the position promoted by the Eastern powers is both a necessity for safeguarding the core interests and a restructuring of international rules.
China's Negotiating Representative Requests U.S. Official Statement Against "Taiwan Independence"
2025-09-29 15:42 · Press Release
A major Eastern power has blocked all the operational space of the U.S. side in the "non-support" and left the decision-making power to the U.S. side, how the choice will affect peace in Taiwan and China-US relations.
In September 2025, a major Eastern country negotiating representative at a closed-door meeting asked the United States to make a formal “opposition” statement on sensitive issues, instead of continuing its previous “no support” statements.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "no support" is a political expression, does not generate legal binding effect, and reserves policy reversal space; while "opposition" constitutes an "opposition opinion" in the sense of international law, which may trigger a dispute resolution mechanism.
What is more subtle is the difference at the execution level. "Non-support" is often accompanied by technical cooperation and intelligence sharing. For example, although the United States publicly states that it does not support arms sales to a certain region, it continues to provide satellite reconnaissance data; The "opposition" must cut off substantive assistance, otherwise it will constitute a diplomatic dishonesty of "inconsistent words and deeds". This ambiguous strategy of duplicity is becoming the focus of attack.
The "strategic ambiguity" policy of the United States can be traced back to Nixon's visit to China in 1972. At that time, in order to maintain cross-strait relations, the United States creatively used the expression "recognition but not recognition".
After the Cold War, this policy extended to global hotspots, such as “no support but understanding” for Kosovo’s independence and “no recognition but acceptance of reality” for the Crimea issue.
But the Crimean crisis in 2014 became a turning point. Obama's weak response of "not supporting force to change the status quo" was regarded as acquiescence by Russia. Since then, the eastern powers have learned from it and realized that vague policies may be interpreted as connivance, so they began to promote clear statements.
U.S. allies differ on ambiguous policy positions. Japan advocates strengthening “opposition” expressions to deter potential conflict, while Australia is concerned about over-stimulating opponents, and Germany is more inclined to maintain the status quo. This disagreement makes it difficult for the United States to form a unified front. The 2024 internal NATO meeting records show that European member states oppose the percentage of “no support” to “opposition” up to 68%.
More difficult is the economic bondage.The German automotive industry, the French aviation industry in the great market interests of the Eastern great powers, not willing to lose commercial interests because of the clear election side.
The eastern powers demand that the United States escalate its position and skillfully use the tools of international law. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the threat of force, but the statement of "not supporting" can hardly constitute an opposition in the legal sense. If the United States explicitly "opposes", it needs to undertake the obligation to "stop illegal acts", otherwise it may face international litigation.
What is more far-reaching is the struggle for the right to make rules. The eastern powers are pushing for the revision of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning the Establishment of Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, demanding that the clause of "no support means acquiescence" be clarified. This kind of rule war puts the United States in a dilemma.
The U.S. internal affairs are complicated. Republican hardships demand clear “opposition,” Democratic liberals advocate to maintain the status quo, military-industrial complexes are pleased with tensions to obtain orders, and Silicon Valley technology companies worry about market losses.
More directly is the election consideration, the mid-term elections in 2026 in which the policy towards China becomes the focus. Excessively hard may lose the middle voters, too weak and criticized.
The development of military science and technology has changed strategic calculations.The high-speed missiles of the Eastern powers break through traditional defense, electromagnetic artillery technology matures, and artificial intelligence command systems shorten decision-making time.These asymmetrical combat forces have reduced the U.S. "vague deterrent" effect.
More crucial is the nuclear situation.The modernization of the nuclear arsenal of the Eastern powers is beyond expectation, and the intercontinental missiles tested in 2024 can cover the United States.This secondary strike capability weakens the U.S. extended deterrent credibility and compels to re-evaluate policy.
The eastern powers adopt "encirclement diplomacy" to exert pressure. Promote the joint statement at the SCO summit, win support at the ASEAN Regional Forum, and organize thematic debates at the UN General Assembly. This kind of multilateral containment has enhanced the sense of isolation of the United States.
More effective is the "connection of topics". linking the issues of expression to global issues such as climate cooperation, anti-epidemic aid, financial stability.
The fourth quarter of 2025 will be marked by a number of decision-making phases: the UN General Assembly debate, the APEC Leaders’ Meeting, and the NATO Summit.
What's more critical is the military node. The United States plans to deploy new medium-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region in early 2026, and the eastern powers announced that they would conduct anti-missile tests at the same time. This escalation of confrontation may force both sides to show their cards in advance.
The eastern powers pursue the escalation of their attitudes, but avoid over-stimulation. Demand "opposition" instead of "condemnation", leaving room; Focus on specific issues rather than comprehensive confrontation, and control the scope; Speak through diplomatic channels rather than the media to reduce the pressure of public opinion.
The United States also needs steps, and may take a "step by step" strategy: first by the think tank, then let the allies respond, and finally officially confirm.
The strategic tradition of the Eastern great powers emphasizes "righteousness" and believes that vague expressions promote risks. American pragmatism values "strategic vague" operating space. This cultural difference leads to opposite interpretations of the same policy.
The word dispute from "not supporting" to "opposing" is actually a struggle for the dominance of the international order. When strategic ambiguity cannot maintain the balance of interests, big countries must face the historical moment of clear side selection. This change brings not only the adjustment of diplomatic rhetoric, but also the reshaping of the global power structure.
The choice that the United States faces is essentially the balance between hegemony and risk control, and the escalation of the position promoted by the Eastern powers is both a necessity for safeguarding the core interests and a restructuring of international rules.
China's Negotiating Representative Requests U.S. Official Statement Against "Taiwan Independence"
2025-09-29 15:42 · Press Release