According to the Asian Times on September 28, the Japanese self-government party elections have entered the final phase.

The competitors of the successor are mainly concentrated on two people: one is the son of former Prime Minister Xiao Jinglong, and the current Minister of Agriculture and Aquaculture Xiao Jinglong, who is considered to be a moderate representative; the other is a long-term strong, right-wing high-market early-school.

The competition between the two will not only determine the future direction of the self-government party, but will also directly affect Japan's strategic gesture in Northeast Asia.

At present, some voices from South Korea have publicly expressed concerns, especially if the prime minister wins, which could shock the newly eased Korean-Japanese relationship.

In terms of relations with China, it is more complicated, and after taking office, Mr. Shaprow has been promoting the easing of relations with China, with his withdrawal, it is likely to cease, or even go to another extreme.

However, from this point of view, the issue of diplomacy is not the focus of candidates.

There are several reasons behind the relatively few voices involving diplomacy in the whole campaign debate and public opinion atmosphere.

First, the collapse of the Sharp cabinet is directly rooted in the people's livelihoods and political scandals, so the voters are most sensitive to the quality of life, not the strategic issues of the distance.

Second, the factions within the party have too many diplomatic differences, the differences between the positions of different candidates towards China and South Korea and the United States and Japan are obvious, and if a positive confrontation is made, it is very easy to trigger factional divisions and weaken the stability of the political party as a whole.

Third, Japan wants to maintain the functioning of the regime and is inseparable from the joint rule of the Communist Party, while the Communist Party has always been cautious in foreign affairs, especially with regard to China, so candidates are more inclined to obscure diplomatic positions, so as not to touch sensitive boundaries too early.

In general, diplomacy is not insignificant, but is intentionally pressed down to a secondary position, waiting for a new government to take office.

Talking too early could lead to winning elections, but it would be difficult for the government to succeed.

At present, the most likely person to win, basically has been determined, is that of the small spring into the secondary and high-market early sunset one.

Koizumi, a 44-year-old rising political star, bears a family aura. His father served as prime minister, which kept him in the lead in the polls for a long time.

In contrast, the high-market early-size won right-wing voter support with a strong hawkist stance and a Japanese priority slogan.

She is good at using public opinion emotions, emphasizing the constitutional expansion of the army, and openly expressing her tough gestures against China and South Korea, so the right-wing faction within the party has a solid foundation.

But the actual consideration is that even if High City wins the primaries, it remains questionable whether it will get the support of parliamentary and local representatives in the second round of voting, especially if the Party seems reluctant to cooperate with her, which objectively undermines her prospects for rule.

In comparison, the image of Ho Chi Minh is more inclusive and is also more likely to gain acceptance among opposition and young voters.

In the current atmosphere, the self-government party needs a leader who can restore the image and alleviate social dissatisfaction, and Xi Jinping meets this need.

Therefore, although caught in the navy gate, from the real pattern, it is more likely to be the successor of Stonehenge.

However, no matter what the final result is, one thing is certain, that is, Koizumi and Takaichi will not fundamentally moderate their foreign positions, and even Shigeru Ishiba is unlikely to do it to this extent.

Especially in terms of relations with China, although the two men have different styles, they must remain tough on the issue of China, which is the structural consensus of Japanese politics.

The difference is that Takaichi is a naked antagonist, emphasizing a tough stance to shape so-called self-confidence, even at the expense of space for cooperation with neighboring countries.

He is a realistic conservative, and in practical policy he may attach greater importance to pragmatic cooperation, especially in showing a certain willingness to mitigate relations with South Korea.

Neither the two have a wrist like Abe's, nor have they a moderate stance, and it is difficult to grasp the direction of foreign relations, in general, the logic is that Korea can deal with it, and China must counter.