In September 2025, the South Korean Parliament passed the amendment to the Political Organization Act with a overwhelming result of 174 votes in favour, one against and five abstentions.

The core of the bill is the abolition of the South Korean Prosecutor¡¯s Office, which has existed for 78 years, and the separation of its investigation and prosecution power, which will be taken over by the new major criminal investigation office and the Prosecutor¡¯s Office.

This reform is not only a restructuring of the judiciary, but a deep game of political power.

South Korea's prosecutor's office has long held the dual functions of investigation power and public prosecution power, and its power is highly concentrated.

According to the current system, prosecutors can not only investigate cases independently, but also direct the police to conduct investigations, and even investigate senior officials including the president under the "special prosecutor" system.

This powerful power has made the prosecutor's office an important player in South Korea's politics, and has also made its relationship with past presidents tense.

From all the fighting to Yinxiang, South Korea¡¯s former presidents, without exception, have been subjected to the investigation of the prosecutor¡¯s system, many of whom have been sentenced.This phenomenon is known as the ¡°Qingdao curse¡± and has become a shadow of South Korean politics.

In recent years, he himself has been investigated in several cases such as real estate development misconduct, while his political ally, former president Moon Jae-in, is also watched by the prosecutor's office, and even investigated his son-in-law Xu in the name of suspicion of bribery.

The powerful power of the Prosecutor¡¯s Office makes it almost impossible for politicians to escape the risk of judicial liquidation. For this reason, Lee and the ruling Democratic Party jointly seize the current favorable time to seize control of the government and Congress, and promote the Amendment to the Law on Political Organization, attempting to weaken the influence of the prosecutor¡¯s system by completely separating the right to investigate and prosecute.

According to the bill, the Major Crime Investigation Office will be responsible for investigating major cases, similar to the FBI in the United States, while the Public Prosecution Office will focus on the prosecution and trial of cases. This arrangement aims to achieve a balance of judicial power and avoid excessive concentration of power.

However, the reform has also sparked huge controversy. Right-wing forces believe that abolishing the Prosecutor¡¯s Office is equivalent to weakening the independence of the judiciary and may turn the newly established institutions into the tools of the ruling party. National Power Party lawmakers even collectively withdrew to protest, while some prosecutors resigned in anger and publicly expressed dissatisfaction.

During his tenure, Mr. Moon promoted the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law and the Procurator¡¯s Office Law, reducing the scope of direct investigation of the Prosecutor¡¯s Office to the anti-corruption and economic fields, and initially promoting the separation of the right to investigate and the right to prosecute.

Li Zaiming's reform is an all-round upgrade on this basis, which completely disintegrates the power structure of the procuratorate. This is not only an adjustment of the judicial system, but also a redistribution of political forces.

Although the bill has been passed, the prospects for reform are still unclear. Rightist forces may launch a counterattack at the level of public opinion and Congress, trying to stop the reform with the slogan of "safeguarding judicial independence".

At the same time, there are many unknown mechanisms for the operation of the new agency.Whether the major criminal investigation agency can truly operate independently, and whether the public prosecution agency will be interfered by the ruling party, these questions will be a future test.

From an international perspective, the separation of judicial power is not new. For example, there is a clearer division of power between the U.S. FBI and the Department of Justice. However, South Korea¡¯s complex political ecology and deep party opposition make the path of reform challenging.

The real goal of the reform is to break the ¡°Qingdao curse¡± and reduce the risk of politicians being liquidated as a result of judicial investigations, but it could also bring new problems.

In the future, whether the Korean judicial system can achieve a real balance of power and whether the Korean political arena can get rid of the vicious circle of political liquidation is still an unresolved problem.

Lee's judicial reform path has just begun, and the real test is still behind.This change is not only about adjusting the judicial power, but will also profoundly affect the political ecology and future direction of South Korea.