Two tons of high-enriched uranium have left Lee unable to get rid of tomorrow night, and his warning voice has just fallen, and the North Korean foreign minister is preparing to visit China, the Chinese side's response this time is somewhat different from before.
In an interview with South Korea's President, Lee said that China and Russia's approach will put South Korea in a difficult position in the field of diplomacy and security.
Three days after the outcome, on September 25, North Korea officially announced that Foreign Minister Trudeau will visit China from September 27 to 30, at the invitation of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
On the same day, South Korea released news that North Korea already has as many as two tons of highly enriched uranium.
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiankun responded to the matter, stating that there were clear differences from previously involved in the issue of the Korean Peninsula.
These things actually illustrate a very critical change.
What changes? That is, China's position on the peninsula issue is following the actual situation, but its position of maintaining peace and stability has never been moved.
First look at the most intuitive differences.
On March 10, after North Korea launched a missile, spokesperson Mao Ning responded that "adhering to the direction of denuclearization of the peninsula" was a clear core statement.
However, on September 25th, when Guo Jiakun responded to the issue of "two tons of highly enriched uranium", he didn't mention "denuclearization" throughout the article, but instead emphasized that "maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and promoting the political settlement process are in the common interests of all parties".
In just six months, why has the expression of gravity changed? the answer is hidden in the actions of North Korea.
In March, although North Korea was promoting its nuclear activities, it had not yet nailed "nuclear support" into law, and the international community still left room for negotiation.
But on September 21st, Kim Jong-un's speech at the Supreme People's Assembly completely blocked this road.
He made it clear that it is necessary to fix the status of nuclear possession through legislation, and also directly said that nuclear weapons are "the inevitable option of safeguarding the survival of the country", and rejected the "stage-by-stage denuclearization" demand of the United States and South Korea.
That is clear.
When one party has used the legal form to turn nuclear possession into an established fact, and then holds on to the old statement of "denuclearization", it is not to adhere to the principle, it is to get away from reality.
The current response must shift from “promoting denuclearization” to “controlling the situation”.
This is not a soft position, but rather to see the essence of the game, now the core of the peninsula issue, is not "whether to go to nuclear", but "how not to fight in the nuclear situation."
More interestingly, this adjustment of the expression just broke the “Chinese-Russian Korean Camp Threat” that Li spoke in his mind.
The outer world is easily rhythmized by the two words "camp", but the contrast details can see the difference.
At the beginning of September, Kim Jong Un visited China, and all of the DPRK talks were real, such as how agricultural cooperation was deepened, how energy fields were intertwined, from the beginning to the end did not mention "military alliance", and the Chinese side repeatedly stressed that "cooperation is not aimed at third parties".
But what about the United States, Japan and South Korea? On September 11th, they held the "Dragon of Perseverance 2025" military exercise and moved the "Typhon" intermediate-range missile system with a range that can cover the Korean Peninsula to the Iwakuni base in Japan.
On the one hand, talking about economic and trade cooperation in the field and power generation, and on the other hand, joint exercises with offensive weapons, this is obviously not the same thing.
In fact, in the final analysis, South Korea's real anxiety is that its own life is too difficult to balance.
Economically, China is inseparable, but security is clinging to the thigh of the United States, and even allows the US military to deploy the intermediate-range missile system around its own home.
This kind of "economy depends on the East and security depends on the West" makes South Korea particularly sensitive to any interaction between China, Russia and the DPRK.
Li said in his mouth that he was afraid of the "camp threat", and in the bone was actually afraid of his balance play broken.
North Korea has gained a firm foothold with its legal and nuclear capability, China has adjusted its strategy with a pragmatic attitude, and South Korea suddenly finds itself caught in the middle. It wants to lean left for fear of losing its economic interests, and wants to lean right for fear of getting burned.
But it should be emphasized that no matter how we adjust our position, the bottom line and position will remain unchanged.
A reversal of the three responses of September 4, 22 and 25 will find that the two phrases “looking at the root of the problem” and “dialogue and consultation to resolve differences” are both in line with the statement of “strengthening coordination and cooperation on the Peninsula issue” at the meeting on September 5.
Even in the face of the sensitive topic of “two tons of high-enriched uranium” thrown out by South Korea, it is not on the road of “blaming North Korea” or “blaming South Korea”, Instead, always focus on the general direction of "political settlement".
This is the key to breaking the deadlock. We neither shout "pressure on North Korea" with the United States, nor shy away from South Korea's security concerns, leaving a window for dialogue for all parties.
Now, this kind of "change and unchange" has begun to work.
On the same day that North Korea selected to hype in South Korea "high-enriched uranium" announcing the news of the visit of Trudeau to China, it is both a tribute to the pressure from South Korea and a way to acknowledge China.
In fact, South Korea is not as tough as Yin Xiaobo during his tenure, but is "willing to ease tensions through dialogue."
This shows that it is useless to face the dry, keeping the dialogue window to hold the situation.
The visit is likely to be a turning point.The DPRK is likely to talk about a “peer-to-peer exchange” idea, which is that North Korea should stop nuclear-related activities and joint military exercises first.
This can respond to Lee's anxiety, which is what is really "camp threat", but is against the mind-blowing, real security, never relying on holding others' thighs, but on everyone to step back and find a balance of interests.
Looking back at China’s expression changes, it’s never a wind-winded compromise, unchanging peace goals, nor a fantasy of shouting slogans.It’s more like a precise trick, the situation has changed, the words and tactics have to change, but the bottom line ofining stability can’t move.
Once everyone understands this, the peninsula can really jump out of the death cycle of "You deter me, I reject you."