The next day, North Korea came to an end, and the DPRK delayed a major project for 15 years, and finally decided what was the project that allowed Kim Jong-un to send heavy officials to China twice in one month?
On the evening of September 27, North Korea’s Foreign Minister, Tri Dogi, arrived in Beijing on a special plane from Goliath Airlines, which was her second visit to China in less than twenty days. Unlike the last time she accompanied Kim Jong-un to the 93rd parade, this time she was an independent representative to visit North Korea and held her first individual meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing.
China's arrangement is quite cautious, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sets the tone by "implementing the important consensus reached by the top leaders". It can be seen that the agenda of the two sides is by no means general communication, but to promote substantive breakthroughs. The outside world has noticed that the time of Cui Shanji's trip happens to be stuck between two key nodes, one is the military parade of the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea on October 10th, and the other is the APEC summit in Gyeongju, South Korea at the end of October. Obviously, this visit to China is not only a "continuation" of Kim Jong-un's trip to Beijing in early September, but also a warm-up for the possible diplomatic actions in the next stage.
When it comes to "substantial breakthroughs", many people's first reaction is-is the big project between China and the DPRK that has dragged on for 15 years going to land? That is, the cross-border cooperation zone from Sinuiju to Dandong and the construction of supporting transportation and power facilities. As early as 2009, China and the DPRK proposed to jointly build a cross-border economic cooperation project similar to the "Sinuiju Special Zone". The plan includes a complete system of new bridges, highways, railways and energy supply. However, limited by North Korea's policy environment, sanctions pressure and external security situation at that time, this idea remained on paper until the completion of the China-North Korea Yalu River Bridge in 2014, but it was not put into use for a long time, becoming a symbolic "half-pull project". Now, with the high-level reactivation of strategic communication between China and the DPRK, this project has finally been finalized.
On the second day of Cui Shanji's visit to China, Foreign Minister Wang Yi bluntly stated during the talks that China and the DPRK should "deepen pragmatic cooperation and push relations to a higher level". These remarks point to the implementation of consensus in specific areas. China-DPRK cooperation is not limited to politics and security, but must also be reflected at the economic level, and the border cooperation zone is the most realistic breakthrough. Once the project lands, it will not only mean that a new logistics channel will be opened from Dandong to Sinuiju, but also become an important fulcrum for North Korea to introduce external investment and improve its domestic economic difficulties. For China, this can not only expand the development space of Northeast China, but also stabilize the surrounding environment of the Korean Peninsula.
At this time, North Korea is actively “dealing” with China, mainly due to two considerations, first, Pyongyang is making a big parade for the 80th anniversary of the Labour Party, which needs to demonstrate not only military strength, but also to prove its diplomatic achievements. If the cooperation project with China can be launched, it will become the capital for Kim Jong Un to declare “a breakthrough” at home. Second, North Korea is very clear that it is difficult to expect Washington to give practical concessions on the peninsula issue, rather than focusing on cooperation with Beijing, so as to stabilize the external environment. Even if it is to negotiate with the United States, it must first ensure that it has sufficient funding.
For China, reactivating big projects is not only a fulfillment of China-DPRK friendship, but also a response to external pressure. At present, the situation in Northeast Asia is complicated. The United States is trying to strengthen pressure on the DPRK through the Korea-Japan alliance, and it is also constantly projecting its military presence to Northeast China. In this context, if China and the DPRK can promote substantive cooperation projects, it will be tantamount to sending a signal to the outside world: China-DPRK relations are not only "political allies", but also strategic partners who can share risks and interests.
More subtly, the advancement of this big project may also be linked to whether Chinese leaders may visit the DPRK in October. Although the outside world generally believes that the difficulty is not small, once China and the DPRK have indeed finalized substantive cooperation, then China's high-level visit to the DPRK will pave the way. If there is a return visit by Chinese heavyweight representatives or even the top leaders in the 80th anniversary military parade of the Workers' Party of Korea, it will become a major event on the diplomatic map of Northeast Asia. This is one of the biggest tasks of Cui Shanji's trip, not only to consolidate consensus, but also to bring a specific cooperation framework back to Pyongyang, so as to provide bright spots for Kim Jong-un on the domestic and international stages.
Therefore, the true meaning of the North Korean intersection is not how ambitious the project itself is, but that it marks a new phase of China-Korea relations from “strategic communication” to “practical landing”. This is behind Pyongyang’s balance of security and development. It can be predicted that once this big project that has been dragged down for 15 years has landed, new changes will inevitably occur in the future, and China-Korea relations will also enter a deeper cycle of cooperation.