On September 26, North Korea announced to the outside that it would implement amnesty on some prisoners from October, the news looked quite sudden, especially in the current context, and seemed more meaningful.
On the one hand, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict continues to heat up, with the contradictory eyes of NATO and Russia looking toward a larger scale development; on the other hand, North Korea is also engaged in economic adjustments, and the outside also has to deal with the increasingly tightening blockade and constraints of the United States and South Korea.
At this point, Kim Jong-un suddenly changed his way of playing, no longer military exercises, missiles, screams, but a seemingly gentle operation, which looks like a decision to shoot his head.
If this matter is placed in other countries, it may be a purely judicial or political action, but in North Korea, amnesty is not a single legal act, but a signal.
It shows that Kim Jong-un is adjusting his strategy under current multiple pressures.
Amnesty is to "free up people"
North Korea is engaged in economic reforms not a day or two, and in recent years it has repeatedly mentioned to promote rural industrialization, narrow the gap between urban and rural areas, and improve local manufacturing.
However, the policy belongs to the policy, and whether it can really move depends on whether there are suitable people to work. The problem now is that the population base of North Korea is not large, and the young labor force is even more tense.
In this case, the release of a group of prisoners could not only alleviate the problem of the shortage of manpower, but also add urgently needed workers to the local construction projects.
After all, this amnesty is more like a “resettlement” of human resources, which was re-integrated into the national development plans, especially some light industry and construction projects, which require a large number of basic workforce, and these people can fill the vacancies.
By restoring their social role, they can both solve the problem of employment and, to a certain extent, mitigate social contradictions.
In addition, North Korea is currently promoting the development idea of "giving priority to local areas", sinking the focus of economic growth to secondary cities and rural areas, and the released people can also be directly arranged to these places.
Amnesty relieves the pressure on the central cities and boosts the vitality of the outskirts, and from this perspective it is more like a “reallocation of human resources” than a mere “policy of tolerance.”
External pressure is high, internal pressure is high.
From the analysis point of view, in addition to the economic needs, this amnesty has a deeper consideration, that is, to deal with the increasing political and military pressure from the outside.
So far, the war between Russia and Ukraine has not only shown no signs of easing, but has become more and more complicated.
Western countries, led by the United States, are tightening sanctions on Russia’s supporters, and North Korea, as a country that is openly on Russia’s side, is clearly a focus.
Meanwhile, tensions between North Korea and the United States continue to escalate, both in joint military exercises and confrontations at the diplomatic level.
In the face of this external pressure, if the internal issue comes up, the situation will be harder to control, so stabilizing social emotions and enhancing political cohesion will become especially important.
The role of amnesty here, in fact, is to "warm down" the society, release a group of prisoners, has both symbolic meaning and practical effect.
On the one hand, it can let the society see the "humanized" actions of the government; on the other hand, it can also alleviate dissatisfaction to some extent.
Especially in the case of limited economic conditions and tight material distribution, this "gift-style" policy is easier to be interpreted as "the country is caring about us".
North Korea’s propaganda system can naturally seize this opportunity, and by packaging this amnesty into “the charity of the country’s leaders,” it can further strengthen the trust of the masses in the upper layers.
In this context, people are more likely to accept the inconvenience of external blockade and understand the difficulty as a “stage of shared patience” rather than a “systemic problem.”
Aiding Russia is not lip service
North Korean-Russian relations have become significantly closer in the past year, especially after the signing of a strategic agreement between the two countries, and North Korea’s support for Russia is no longer limited to verbal but gradually reflected in practical actions.
Whether it comes to providing weapons and volunteer support messages, it shows that North Korea is not just an observer, but the problems come with it, and if North Korea really wants to continue supporting Russia, it may not be enough to rely on its existing forces and resources.
What's more, NATO is also discussing whether to directly intervene in the Ukrainian battlefield. Once the situation escalates, North Korea may have to further increase its support.
At this time, amnesty is not just as simple as releasing personnel. It can also be used as a way of "force reserve" to prepare for subsequent military deployment.
The people who were released, and how they would be arranged, were not publicly explained by the North Korean government.
But from past experience, it is likely that some of them will be incorporated into the military system, especially if there are already “foreign missions,” and the re-service is perfectly convenient.
In addition to North Korea’s recent frequent holding of various honorary conferences, public praise to Russian personnel, and the time of amnesty, it doesn’t seem to be a coincidence.
In addition, from the current state of cooperation between North Korea and Russia, this support is mutually beneficial.
North Korea needs Russia’s energy, equipment and technology, while Russia needs North Korea’s human and material support, and relations between the two countries are no longer “friendly” in the general sense, but “deep bonds” based on real interests.
In this context, Kim Jong-un must be prepared in advance for possible situation changes, and amnesty is one of them.
From the point of view of this amnesty, Kim Jong-un is indeed adjusting his way of governance, and that kind of hard-to-hard practice in the past is no longer useful in the face of the current situation.
Now he has begun to try the "soft and hard belt" strategy, first to stabilize the society, put the people alive, and at the same time to anticipate future conflicts.
This does not mean that North Korea is moving toward opening up, nor that it will give up confrontation, but it shows North Korea is aware that the current situation requires more flexible tactics to respond.
This kind of release of personnel, which is extremely rare in North Korea, precisely illustrates the urgency of the situation, both to maintain the internal and external lines, and to struggle for a little breathing space in the game of the great powers.
How North Korea will go in the future depends to a large extent on the development of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and whether the United States and South Korea will continue to increase their efforts, but what is certain is that Kim Jong-un has begun to play chess in a different way.
reference
North Korea announces amnesty and will be implemented in October 2025-09-28 17: 37 · Shangguan News