Planned planned
The editor planned.
In December 2024, former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled his country and finally stumbled on Russia to seek asylum, 10 months later, on September 27, 2025, the Russian satellite news agency suddenly issued an absent arrest warrant for Assad, who is still in Russia.
What exactly is Syria doing? In the face of the wanted demands of Russia's former allies, should it hand over Assad, or should it continue to shelter under pressure?
During the September 24 session of the UN General Assembly, Syria re-established ties with Ukraine, which has been under US-EU sanctions, isolated and in urgent need of external assistance for its economy and livelihoods.
And Ukraine is the object of the Western camp's main support, and the reconciliation with Ukraine is equivalent to delivering the root olive branch to the United States of Europe.
But it is not enough to reconcile, and Western trust in the new Syrian regime is not so easy to establish, and there is a vote, and Assad has just become this point of entry.
As for the Ministry of Justice's announcement of "137 dead, more than 300 tortured," these are not new information, the Delaware case is more than the old case many years ago, why is it now suddenly turned up?
The core is to communicate to both sides at home and abroad, show the resolve to liquidate the old accounts through the former president, and stabilize the domestic public opinion.
Externally, especially towards the United States and Europe, use this action to prove the attitude of cutting away from the past, so as to pave the way for subsequent assistance and lifting sanctions.
But Assad is now in Russia, with a search warrant, it is not possible to catch anyone, so their real purpose is never to catch Assad, but to use this paper to push diplomatic code.
This trick both showed good with Ukraine, and also sent a signal to the U.S. Europe, and by the way explored the bottom line of Russia.
But such a probe has pushed Russia into a dilemma. Having hands may shake its foundation in the Middle East. If you don't have hands, you will have to withstand the pressure of the new Syrian regime and even affect the existing cooperation between the two sides.
In fact, Russia is unwilling to hand over people, the core reason is that its strategic interests are in the hands of Syria, specifically the two military bases of Tartus and Khmeimim.
By 2022, in order to take over the long-term lease agreement of the two bases, Russia directly discharged $8 billion in debt to Syria.
Because the two bases are too critical for Russia, the Tartus Naval Base is the only deep-sea port of Russia outside the CIS, equivalent to the Russian navy’s entry into the Middle East and the Mediterranean.
Without Tartus, the Russian Navy’s fleet in the Mediterranean Sea would have no roots, the aircraft carrier would have no place to rely on supplies, ship maintenance and personnel rotation would be a problem, let alone holding on to Western forces, and even the sense of presence in this region would have been severely disrupted.
There is also a more direct role of the air base in Hremim, where thousands of fighter jets take off every year, which are not only used to fight extremists in Syria, but also to look at the Western military movements in the Middle East, equivalent to the Russian air eye in the Middle East.
In fact, as early as the Soviet Union, Russia relied on Syria to take root in the Middle East. These two bases are the continuation of the layout of that year, and now they are the key to Russia to maintain its influence in the Middle East.
If they are lost, Russia's investment in the Middle East in the past few decades will be in vain, and it will be double the difficulty to come back in the future.
Per Russia's asylum to Assad has a moral component, but more of an interest consideration, Assad as a former president, has some influence on the situation in Syria and the Middle East relations.
Keeping him in touch with the old Syrian forces, he can also send a letter to other Middle Eastern allies, "follow Russia, you will not be abandoned at will."
Although Russia is having a hard time now, hundreds of billions of rubles have been spent on military spending on the Ukrainian battlefield, and Western sanctions have been strangling its neck. Both the economy and the military need to take a breath. Will it be to ease relations or change the cooperation of the new Syrian regime?, hand over Assad?
But the risks are much greater than the benefits of handing over people, and the West doesn't regard Assad as a valuable bargaining chip at all.
The West really cares about Ukraine’s territorial integrity, arms restrictions on Russia, and energy interests in the Middle East.
Assad, a former Syrian president, can neither control the situation in Ukraine nor affect these core interests, mostly as a secondary topic.
Even if Russia hands over the people, the West will not relax the sanctions, let alone give in on the Ukrainian issue. Russia will not do this kind of deal that outweighs the gain.
What’s more, it completely undermined the confidence of Russia’s allies in the Middle East, and Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon have been working closely with Russia for years, whether it’s fighting extremists or balancing the West.
Even now that the new Syrian regime is still withdrawing the Iranian army, Iran would have been a bit unhappy, if Russia returned, it would be equivalent to pushing Iran far.
The support of its allies in the Middle East is an important force for Russia to check and balance the West. Without these partners, it is equivalent to breaking its arms, and its future layout in the Middle East will only be more passive.
And the pressure from the West won’t stop because of the deal, as early as August 2025, France issued an international arrest warrant for Assad, saying he planned an attack on the media center in Homs in 2012.
Now many countries in the European Union are also looking at this, and even if they get along, the West will find other reasons to pressure, since they can not change the benefits, but will lose allies, Russia will naturally not go this way.
Since the relationship is unrealistic, the pressure is heavy and the fear of affecting the relationship with the new regime in Syria, how should Russia break up?
In fact, looking back on history, Russia has had similar experiences for a long time, and the case of former Ukrainian President Yanukovych in 2014 is a ready-made reference.
After a change in the situation in Ukraine in 2014, Yanukovych fled to Russia, where he was granted political asylum.
Faced with extradition demands from Ukraine and the West, Russia has made it clear not to extradite, while quietly placing Yanukovych in a safe place.
In this way, neither has a clutter with Ukraine, but has kept the position of its asylum ally, this Assad case, Russia will probably follow this mature program.
Under international law, political asylum is a sovereign state’s right, and Russia can fully justify Assad’s allegations of a political nature, a statement that is both in line with the rules and a signal of non-compromise to the outside world.
In addition, Russia may quietly adjust Assad's resettlement place. Now Assad's specific location in Russia has not been made public. If Syria and the West press him hard, Russia may transfer him to Belarus.
After all, Belarus is Russia’s iron-bone ally, and the attitude toward the West is also tough, putting people there can both guarantee security and reduce the pressure of Russia’s mainland, and will not completely tear face with the new regime in Syria.
This operation, looking back and forth, is in fact a three-fold operation, both preserving the two strategic gateways of Tartus and Hemeimim, and not shaking the Middle East layout.
It has also given Syria a new regime, after all, the other party's core demand is to send a search warrant to the outside world, not really to arrest people.
At the same time, it is not necessary to be tough with the West, avoiding new sanctions or conflict because of Assad.
The Putin administration is clear that the new Syrian regime does not dare to really turn the face for Assad and Russia, after all, these two bases are also beneficial for Syria, thanks to Russian military cooperation, Syria can get security security and also get some economic support.
Syria's search warrant, in essence, is a gesture to the US and Europe, as long as Russia does not completely refute its face, the two sides can continue to cooperate.
The search orders in Syria look sharply, saying that it is ultimately the new regime to struggle for international support and stabilize domestic political movements.
And Russia’s choice, from the beginning to the end, has been around the strategic interests of the Middle East, Tartus and Hermitage bases cannot be lost, the confidence of Middle Eastern allies cannot be broken, and ineffective pressure from the West does not need to compromise.
From Assad’s escape to Russia in December 2024, to a search warrant issued by Syria in September 2025, and to the coincidence of the time when he returned to Ukraine, every step in this wave of turmoil is through the smell of mutual interests.
Russia will not give up its strategic foundation because of a wanted order, nor will it abandon its allies because of short-term pressure, nor will the new Syrian regime really offend Russia, which can give it security, in order to catch Assad.
The tension on the surface may last for a while, but the balance of core interests has been biased towards not making friends with others from the very beginning, because in international politics, there is never a choice for no reason, only the inevitable result after weighing the advantages and disadvantages.
Source of information:
Syrian media: Syrian court issued an arrest warrant for former President Bashar Assad – Russian satellite news agency