On this day 46 years ago, on February 17, 1979 (January 21, 1979), Deng Xiaoping leaked the real reason why the Chinese People's Liberation Army did not attack Hanoi in 1979. The Chinese People's Liberation Army occupied Gaoping from February 17 to March 16, 1979. The border guards of the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched a self-defense counterattack against the hegemonists in Vietnam who were constantly armed to invade our country's territory. The Vietnamese authorities, encouraged and supported by the Soviet Union, out of their national expansionist ambitions, betrayed their faith, regarded friends as enemies, regarded China as the "number one enemy", frantically opposed China and excluded China, and constantly carried out armed aggression and provocation against our country. The Vietnamese army invaded our country's territory, destroyed our villages, killed our soldiers and civilians, and seriously threatened and undermined the security and socialist construction in our country's border areas. The Chinese government has repeatedly raised warnings and protests, but the Vietnamese authorities have ignored them. Our border guards could not bear it any longer and were ordered to launch a punitive self-defense counterattack against the Vietnamese invaders on February 17. During more than 20 days of operations, our border guards severely damaged 10 regiments of 4 regular divisions of the Vietnamese army, killed more than 37,300 enemies, captured more than 2,200 enemies, captured a large number of weapons, equipment and combat materials, destroyed a large number of military facilities built against our country in northern Vietnam, and dealt a powerful blow to the Vietnamese invaders. Politically, the military achieved a major victory. After completing the intended purpose, the Chinese border troops were all withdrawn to China on March 16. Wang Zhen was commissioned by the central government to offer condolences to the officers and soldiers who participated in the counter-attack. Extended reading: Deng Xiaoping leaked the real reason why the People's Liberation Army did not attack Hanoi in 79 years. Extended reading: Deng Xiaoping leaked the real reason why the People's Liberation Army did not attack Hanoi in 79 years. On February 17, 1979, China launched a multi-track attack on northern Vietnam from the southern provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan. The number of troops invested shows the importance China attaches to this operation - it is estimated that more than 200,000 People's Liberation Army troops were dispatched, and may even reach 400,000. One historian said that the troops that went out at that time included "regular ground troops, militias, and naval and air forces... The scale is equivalent to China's large-scale invasion of Korea in November 1950." Chinese official coverage called the operation a "self-defense counterattack against Vietnam" or a "self-defense counterattack on the Sino-Vietnamese border." This is Chinese-style deterrence, in which troops are announced in advance to prevent Vietnam's next move. The Chinese military's target this time is also a socialist country, which was a recent ally of China and has long received Chinese economic and military support. The purpose of the operation is to maintain the strategic balance in Asia in China's eyes. Moreover, China's operation has received moral support, diplomatic assistance and intelligence cooperation from the United States - the "imperialist countries" that Beijing helped drive out of Indochina five years ago. China claims that the goal of the war is to "contain Vietnam's ambitions and give them a limited lesson appropriately." " "Appropriate" meant enough damage to influence Vietnam's future choices and plans; "limited" implied that the operation would end before foreign intervention began or other factors caused the situation to spiral out of control. The war was also a direct challenge to the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping's prediction that the Soviet Union would not attack China was confirmed. The day after the Chinese attack, the Soviet government issued a bland statement condemning China's "criminal" attack, while emphasizing that "the heroic Vietnamese people... can still defend themselves this time." The Soviet military response was limited to sending a naval task force to the South China Sea, conducting a limited arms airlift to Hanoi, and stepping up air patrols along the Sino-Soviet border. Airlifts of weapons were limited by both geography and hesitation within the Soviet Union. After all, the Soviet Union's support for its new ally, Vietnam, in 1979 was no different from that given to its old ally, China, in the Taiwan Strait crisis two decades earlier - in both cases the Soviet Union was unwilling to risk expanding the war. Immediately after the war ended, Hua Guofeng summed up the outcome of the war with a succinct proverb that was highly disrespectful to Soviet leaders: "They threatened us, mobilized troops near the border, and sent ships to the South China Sea. But they didn't dare to do it. So we still touched the tiger's butt." Deng Xiaoping mockingly rejected US advice to be careful. When US Treasury Secretary Mike Blumenthal visited Beijing in late February 1979, he called on China to withdraw its troops from Vietnam "as soon as possible" because Beijing was "taking unnecessary risks." Deng Xiaoping disagreed. Speaking to American reporters before his meeting with Blumenthal, he showed disdain for vague swings, mocking that "some people are afraid to offend Cuba in the East." As in the Sino-Indian war, China withdrew its troops immediately after a limited "punitive" strike. The fighting ended in 29 days. Shortly after the People's Liberation Army captured the provincial capitals of three provinces on the Vietnamese border, Beijing announced that Chinese troops would withdraw from Vietnam, except for a few disputed territories. Beijing did not try to overthrow the government in Hanoi. A month after China's withdrawal, Deng Xiaoping explained China's strategy to Kissinger: Deng Xiaoping: As soon as I came back (from the United States), I went to war. But we asked your opinion beforehand. I talked to President Carter about this, and he gave a very formal and serious answer. He read me a written speech. I said to him: China will handle this problem on its own, at any risk. In retrospect, it might have been better if we went a little deeper when we punished Vietnam. Kissinger: Possibly. Deng Xiaoping: Because we had enough troops to go all the way to Hanoi. But that's not a good way. Kissinger: Yes, that might be beyond the plan. Deng Xiaoping: Yes, you're right. But we can go another 30 kilometers. We have taken all the fortifications, and there is no line of defense all the way to Hanoi. Historians generally agree that this war was very costly for China. " The influence of the People's Liberation Army's political leadership during the "Cultural Revolution" was laid bare in the war: the Chinese army was slow to advance and suffered heavy losses due to outdated equipment, poor logistics, personnel shortages, and rigid tactics. However, this view is based on a misunderstanding of China's strategy. Despite all its shortcomings in execution, China's war reflects its serious long-term strategic analysis. In their interpretation of the US, Chinese leaders describe Vietnam's consolidation of its power in Indochina with Soviet support as a crucial step in the Soviet Union's "strategic deployment" around the world. The Soviet Union had already massed heavy troops in Eastern Europe and on the Chinese border. Now, Chinese leaders warn that the Soviet Union is "also beginning to establish bases" in Indochina, Africa and the Middle East. Once it solidified its position in these regions, it could control vital energy sources and block key sea lanes - especially the Strait of Malacca, which connects the Pacific and Indian Oceans - which would give the Soviet Union the strategic initiative in future conflicts. Broadly speaking, China fought this war out of an analysis of what Sun Tzu called "potential" - the direction and "potential" of the strategic situation. Deng Xiaoping's goal was to stop, and if possible reverse, the momentum of Soviet strategy; in his eyes, this momentum was unacceptable. China achieved this goal, partly by military boldness, and partly by drawing the United States into closer cooperation with it than ever before. In guiding the counter-offensive against Vietnam, China's leaders showed fine analysis of strategic choices, bold execution, and skillful diplomacy. Even so, they would not have been able to "touch the tiger's butt" without the cooperation of the United States. Deng Xiaoping did not persuade Vietnam's Beijing to hold back for 40 trillion Nansha. A month ago, General Liu Yajia, political commissar of the National Defense University, asserted that the period of strategic opportunity has never been achieved by seeking stability, but by fighting. Now General Qiao Liang, a strategic expert of the People's Liberation Army, has expressed a different view. If China goes to war, it will be choked by the United States and its allies, and it will lose the thousand-year strategic opportunity for national rejuvenation. In the eyes of ordinary people who bear the burden of war, regardless of war and peace, it is a good strategy that can avoid hunger and cold and invigorate China. Two generals, Liu Yajia and Qiao Liang, are both senior think tanks in Zhongnanhai. Their theories have long been well-known in the world's military academic circles and have a profound influence on the public opinion of Europe, America, Japan and Russia. Domestic military netizens often talk about their golden sentences. Thinking about war and peace is leisurely, and this is the only big thing. Let's look at the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and whether the strategic opportunity for peaceful rise is created or tolerated? In Chinese history, the main war faction has left its name on the young history, and the main peace faction has been notorious for thousands of years. Specific to each dynasty and every war, taking the best interests of the Chinese nation as the starting point and the standard for judging war and peace must be analyzed pragmatically and realistically. In 1894, Japan was aggressive and aggressive in the Korean issue. Empress Dowager Cixi and Emperor Guangxu took the lead in the battle. The "Houdang" and Li Hongzhang became typical examples of traitors and traitors, and generations of Chinese people have accepted this historical conclusion from textbooks. Only a few historians will analyze according to historical conditions, what methods the Guangxu Emperor and his master Weng Tonghe and other warring factions can win the Sino-Japanese War. The so-called "period of strategic opportunity has always been played out". Is this heroic slogan universally true? Did the good situation of China's opening up and reform for more than 30 years come out of the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979? Liu Yahua wrote to Yang Shangkun, vice chairperson of the Central Military Commission, in 1987, lamenting that "the Laoshan operation should be stopped immediately", boldly pointing out that this war did not play a role in gathering the hearts and minds of the soldiers, but instead brought harm to the construction of the style of the troops. In my opinion, the Vietnamese border issue is only a scab compared to the Taiwan issue and India's occupation of China's 120,000 square kilometers of land. Moreover, Vietnam has not been convinced by Deng Xiaoping at all, but has occupied a large number of islands, reefs and maritime territory in China's Nansha until now. As far as the Sino-Vietnamese border and maritime border issues are concerned, it is better to say that Beijing relies on a word of tolerance in exchange for a 30-year strategic opportunity period. The strategy of the word tolerance by strategist Qiao Liang is also debatable. He believes that whether it is the Diaoyu Islands issue or the Huangyan Island dispute, it is essentially a situation made by the United States for China. As long as we go to war with any other country, the United States will mobilize relevant countries and mobilize the whole world to oppose China, and there will be a real C-shaped encirclement of the United States against China. Although we get a small island, we will lose the long-term development interests of the country. The problem is that the People's Liberation Army did not attack the Philippines and Vietnam, so did the United States not mobilize relevant countries to build a C-type strategic encirclement against China? China's superiority over the Philippines, from economy, politics to military, is absolutely overwhelming, and today it is tolerated, causing a big international joke that a strong country has no diplomacy. The common people feel that the country is prosperous and strong, and military spending has increased significantly. There are aircraft carriers, nuclear missiles, J-10 fighter jets, and nuclear submarines. How can they be bullied by a poor and backward Philippines with frequent civil strife and swallow their anger? Zhongnanhai's loss of national cohesion is immeasurable. Qiao Liang pointed out that the resources China has obtained from the world support more than 40 trillion yuan of GDP and more than 30,000 billion US dollars of foreign exchange reserves. Vietnam has drilled wells in the Nansha for six years, and produced about 60 billion US dollars of oil, and Vietnam has made 20 billion dollars and 3 trillion dollars? compared with more than 40 trillion yuan? 20 billion dollars is a drop in the bucket for china.