Eighty-one years ago today, on March 10, 1944 (February 16, 1944 lunar calendar), the Japanese invading army formulated and implemented the No. 1 battle plan. On March 10, 1944, the Japanese invading army formulated and implemented the No. 1 battle plan. In 1944, in order to save the crisis, Japan replaced the two chiefs of the army and the navy, with Lu Minister Tojo Hideki and Chief of Staff, and Sea Minister Shimada and Chief of the Military Command Department. It hoped to quickly implement the "No. 1 operation" ("No. 1 operation" refers to the operation of opening up the Chinese mainland transportation line). After many meetings and several revisions, the Japanese "Chinese dispatched army" officially formulated and communicated the "No. 1 battle plan" to the various armies on March 10. Its "operational objective" was to "defeat the enemy forces, occupy and secure key points along the Xianggui, Guangdong-Han, and southern Beijing-Han railways, in order to destroy the main bases of the enemy air force, and to stop the enemy's attempts to attack the imperial mainland and disrupt maritime traffic." Its "operational principle" was to "send troops to launch attacks in the spring and summer of 1944, first from North China, then from Wuhan and South China, to defeat the enemy forces, especially the Central Army, and to occupy and secure the southern Beijing-Han railways south of the Yellow River and the key points along the Xianggui-Han and Guangdong-Han railways, respectively. Second, as long as the situation allows, in January-February 1945, capture the vicinity of Nanning, and open up and ensure the passage from Guilin to Langshan. In the course of combat, efforts should be made to repair the Beijing-Han Southern Railway and the Guangdong-Han Railway. If circumstances permit, the Xianggui Railway should be repaired together. "