Ninety years ago today, on June 16, 1935 (May 16, 1935 in the lunar calendar), the meeting of the two estuaries failed to resolve the differences between Zhang Guotao and the central government. On June 16, 1935, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Luo Fu called Zhang Guotao and others: From now on, the general policy of our First and Fourth Front Armies should be to occupy the three provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, and establish the Soviet power of the three provinces. In the areas centered on Maogong, the west bank of the Dadu River and even Xikang, the conditions were too poor, and "it seems that the main force is not a long-term strategy". On the 17th, Zhang Guotao called the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and disagreed with the central government's policy of "occupying the three provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu". He proposed that the Red Army go north and west to "occupy Qinghai and Xinjiang" or "temporarily attack On the 20th, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Luo Fu called Zhang Guotao, once again proposing that it would be "more advantageous to move to the west for combat," and asked Zhang Guotao to "come to Maogong immediately to discuss everything." On June 26, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting in Lianghekou, northern Maogong County, to discuss the strategic policy after the meeting of the Red Army of the First and Fourth Fronts. At the meeting, Zhou Enlai reported that it was impossible for the troops to go east to south, and they should go to Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gan to establish base areas. Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Bogu, Wang Jiaxiang, Liu Bocheng, Luo Fu, and Zhang Guotao all agreed, and on the 28th, the meeting passed the "Decision on the Strategic Policy after the Meeting of the First and Fourth Fronts." "Our strategic policy is to concentrate our main forces and attack northward, destroy the enemy in large numbers in the campaign, and first take southern Gansu in order to create the base area of Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu," it said, emphasizing: "In order to achieve this strategic policy, we must resolutely oppose the tendency to avoid the retreat of the war and the tendency to stay still. These right opportunistic swings are the main danger in the current struggle to create a new Soviet area." On June 29, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission formulated the "Songpan Campaign Plan" in accordance with the spirit of the decision of the Lianghekou Conference, and decided to take advantage of the opportunity when Hu Zong's southern part of Chiang Kai-shek's direct line arrived in Songpan and the bunker was not built, and use the superior forces of the two front armies of the Red Army to eliminate the southern part of Hu Zong in Songpan area, and control the roads north and northeast of Songpan, so as to facilitate the northward operation and development. After Zhang Guotao returned to Zagu, the headquarters of the Red Fourth Front Army, he did not agree to go northward, and held back on the grounds that the "organizational problem of unified command" had not been resolved, resulting in the failure of the "Songpan Campaign Plan".