On this day 46 years ago, on November 25, 1979 (October 6, 1979 in the lunar calendar), the "Bohai No. 2" drilling ship sank. On November 25, 1979, the "Bohai No. 2" drilling ship of the Offshore Petroleum Exploration Bureau of the Ministry of Petroleum capsized during the towing operation of the transfer well position in the Bohai Bay. 72 people died and the direct economic loss reached more than 37 million yuan. This is the most significant death accident since the founding of Tianjin and the oil system, and it is also rare in the history of offshore oil exploration in the world. The "Bohai No. 2" drilling ship is a jack-up drilling platform introduced from abroad in 1973. It consists of three parts: a sinking pad, a platform and a pile foot. It is a large special non-motorized ship and is used for offshore oil drilling operations. When moving to a new well position, it should be unloaded, so that the variable load of the whole ship is minimized, the platform is lowered, the sinking pad is lifted, and the sinking pad is close to the platform. The ballast water in the ballast tank of the sinking pad is excluded, the anchor is lifted, and the wedge is placed at each foot to fix it, and finally it is towed by a tugboat. According to the investigation, in November 1979, the Bureau of Offshore Petroleum Exploration planned to move the "Bohai No. 2" drilling ship from the original well position to the new well position with a sailing distance of 117 nautical miles. In order to arrange the relocation and towing task of "Bohai No. 2", a towing meeting was held on the morning of November 22 by the person in charge of the General Dispatch Office of the Bureau. Before the meeting, on November 12, the captain of "Bohai No. 2" sent a telegram from the sea, informing him that the No. 3 submersible pump on the platform had fallen into the water and asking for divers to be sent to salvage it. After the migration mission of "Bohai No. 2" was determined, on November 20 and 21, the captain of "Bohai No. 2" sent telegrams from the sea twice, asking the Bureau and the Drilling Department to send divers to salvage the submersible pump estimated to have fallen on the buoyancy (cushion) tank, unload it and tow it with three boats, namely the main tow of the 8000 horsepower tugboat, and the other two left rear and right rear tow, pointing out that this stability is good and the towing speed is fast. At the towing meeting, I read the telegrams of the captain of "Bohai No. 2" on the 20th and 21st, and decided after discussion: not to unload and salvage the submersible pump in the original well position (in order to avoid the submersible pump breaking the platform, leave a 1-meter gap between the buoyancy (cushion) cabin and the platform), in order to be in position, set up a transition point at 4 nautical miles from the new well position to lift the ship once, and unload the fishing pump. If the water depth of the new well position can be directly in place, no transition point will be set, and no more fishing pump will be unloaded; the tugboat only uses a 282 tugboat with 8000 horsepower. On the morning of November 23rd, at the meeting of the leading cadres of the bureau, another person in charge of the general dispatching room of the bureau briefly reported the matters decided by the towing meeting. The leaders of the bureau did not raise any objection to this and agreed. That night, tugboat No. 282 arrived at the "Bohai No. 2" and dropped anchor to be towed. On the morning of November 24th, the Tianjin, Hebei and Shandong Meteorological Observatories issued a gale warning. The person in charge of the general dispatching room of the bureau reported to the meeting of the leading cadres of the bureau and estimated that "Bohai No. 2" would not land. At the same time, the dispatching staff of the drilling department also suggested to the person in charge that "Bohai No. 2" should not land the ship, but the person in charge of the department only instructed "Bohai No. 2" to be informed of the situation of the meteorological department, and did not make a decision not to land the ship. At 8:3 on November 24, tugboat No. 282 approached "Bohai No. 2" and was ready to bring a cable. Due to the large swell, it failed; at 8:59, the second cable was successful, and the ship was disembarked immediately. At 10:44, the towing began. At that time, the freeboard height of "Bohai No. 2" was about 1 meter (it should be more than 3 meters). After 20:00, the wind gradually increased, reaching 8 to 9, and the gust was 10. Due to the low freeboard, the deck was submerged in the water. At 2:10 a.m. on November 25, the ventilator of "Bohai No. 2" was interrupted, and a large amount of seawater poured into the pump cabin. The whole ship's employees worked hard and bravely to rescue the danger. In the end, due to the serious danger, the blockage was ineffective, and the hull quickly lost balance. At 3:35, the sea surface toppled and sank at 119 degrees, 37 minutes and 8 seconds east longitude and 38 degrees, 41 minutes and 5 seconds north latitude. Of the 74 employees on board, except for 2 who were rescued, all other comrades were killed. After the "Bohai No. 2" drilling ship capsized, the tugboat No. 282 did not immediately send an international distress signal and determine the position of the sunken ship in accordance with the navigation regulations, and the exact location of the sunken ship was delayed. The lifeboats and life rafts on board also did not rescue people. The main reason for this accident was that the submersible pump suspected to have fallen on the sinking tank was not salvaged during towing, resulting in a gap of 1 meter between the sinking tank and the platform, and the two parts could not be attached tightly, thus losing the conditions for excluding the ballast water in the sinking tank. This makes the "Bohai No. 2" heavy load, deep draft, low freeboard, and poor stability, which destroys the requirements of the complete stability of the "Bohai No. 2" towing operation, seriously weakens the ship's ability to withstand wind and waves, violates the provisions of the "Instructions for the Use of Jumping Drilling Ships" formulated by the ship manufacturer, and also violates the provisions of the "Interim Regulations on the Use of Bohai No. 2 Drilling Ships" formulated by the Bureau that ballast water should be excluded from towing, and does not meet the rules and requirements of towing status. It is understood that the occurrence of the "Bohai No. 2" capsizing accident is no accident, but the result of the Offshore Petroleum Exploration Bureau's long-term neglect of safety work and failure to respect objective laws in offshore oil drilling production. According to incomplete statistics from 1975 to 1979 alone, there were 1,043 accidents of various types in the bureau (including more than 30 major accidents), resulting in 105 deaths and 114 serious injuries, and the economic losses were staggering. After the accident, most of the people did not mobilize the masses to carefully sum up experience and lessons and try to solve the hidden dangers of the accident. At the end of 1977, the Bureau's "Bohai No. 1" drilling platform had a broken leg accident, but fortunately there was no accident that caused the ship to capsize and kill people. Afterwards, the leaders failed to raise vigilance and did not fully mobilize the masses to analyze the cause of the accident and learn lessons from facts. Instead, they were enthusiastic about draping red flowers on the relevant personnel and engaging in large-scale commendation activities. As a result, instead of improving the work according to the past, they promoted the atmosphere of disrespect for science, illegal command and risk-taking. What's even more ridiculous is that the Bureau never translated or studied the "Stability Calculation Book" and other foreign language materials of the "Bohai No. 2" drilling ship. It was not until after the accident that the Tianjin Municipal People's Procuratorate asked someone to translate it in order to investigate the case. On August 25, 1980, the State Council issued a decision on the handling of the "Bohai No. 2" accident. It decided that after the "Bohai No. 2" drilling ship capsized in the Bohai Bay, the Ministry of Petroleum did not seriously investigate the cause of the accident, did not report the situation to its superiors truthfully, and did not take effective measures to deal with the responsible personnel. Eight months after the accident, the Ministry of Petroleum still did not take it seriously. It was only due to the strict supervision of the leading comrades of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, and the unanimous accusations of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and public opinion that the Ministry of Petroleum made a more realistic and profound inspection. The occurrence of the "Bohai No. 2" capsizing accident was caused by the leaders of the Ministry of Petroleum not acting according to objective laws, not respecting science, not paying attention to safe production, not paying attention to the opinions of employees and historical lessons. The leaders of the Ministry of Petroleum bear a major responsibility for this. The improper handling of this serious accident by the leaders of the State Council is also an important dereliction of duty, and they should admit their mistakes to the people of the whole country. After listening to the reports of the Ministry of Petroleum and other relevant parties, the meeting of the State Council decided: (1) Accept the request of Comrade Song Zhenming, dismiss him as Minister of Pet 2) Comrade Kang Shien, Vice Premier of the State Council in charge of the petroleum industry, did not take this accident seriously and dealt with it in a timely manner. He was directly responsible for the leadership work of the State Council and decided to give a major transgression. (3) The State Council expresses deep condolences to the comrades who died on "Bohai No. 2" and extends deep condolences to their families. On August 27, 1980, the Ministry of Petroleum Industry announced the list of casualties in the capsizing accident of the "Bohai No. 2" drilling ship: Liu Xue, Ding Commune, Ma Ming, Wang Dunqing, Wang Zhiquan, Wang Zhihui, Wang Wende, Ye Xianfu, Shi Guangzhao, Tian Liquan, Mi Juechu, Liu Hongzhi, Liu Jianzhi, Liu Jianying, Liu Zhibin, Liu Yunzhi, Liu Zhibin, Guan Xuekun, Ren Xinjian, Qi Wensuo, Yang Zaiwu, Yang Guanghua, Yang Wanshan, Li Hualin, Li Fucheng, Li Jinyuan, Li Shouxing, Li Fengming, Li Jie, Li Yiming, Li Qingsheng, Wu Lianfu, Wu Shuijing, Wu Liangmu, Shen Mingyi, Bi Yumin Zhang Changxi, Zhang Fuchuan, Zhang Juncheng, Zhang Ronghua, Zhang Guomin, Zhang Xiliang, Zhang Chunli, Zhang Jiangping, Chen Wenbin, Chen Jinsheng, Chen Shuliang, Chen Dahuai, Zhou Qifu, Hu Jianjian, Zhao Xiangguo, Fan Lin, Fan Liquan, Zheng Yang, Hou Wenbin, Xu Desheng, Qin Dongliang, Gaoyang, Gao Jianzhong, Sanggenshen, Gu Yi, Liang Fulong, Kang Yuyi, Huang Yin, Huang Xinxing, Jiang Lanhua, Jiang Jiakun, Ge Chunsheng, Lu Shijian, Jin Xiangqi, Xie Jianhua.