The Russian high-ranking army in the past few days, a paper order came out, the once legendary Colonel Alexander Rabin was ordered to dismiss all military duties, "transition" in the field, and transfer to the place to engage in the recruitment.

Russia's "Izvestia" reported on September 21st that Russia's Channel 78 quoted the information office of the Russian Leningrad Military District as saying that Alexander Rabin, commander of the Leningrad Military District, had been dismissed from his military post.

To be honest, Rapin, the general who stood at the intersection of power and war, was ¡°picked out¡± by Putin¡¯s own hands and degraded from the center.

This change is not just a personnel adjustment, but more like a liquidation after a battlefield defeat, and it is also like a signal flare for Putin to drastically transform the entire Russian military command system.

From military district commander to local counselor: LaPin¡¯s path to ¡°crash¡±

Alexander Lapin was originally one of Putin's most relied on generals. He made military exploits in the Syrian war in his early years. As a result, he rose all the way and became the commander of the Central Military Region, holding great power.

At the time, Rabin was synonymous with "Gong Hehe."But the war was not an exercise, and when it came to Ukraine, the reality on the battlefield was far more cruel than in the Middle East at the time.

In September 2022, the Ukrainian army launched a counter-offensive in Kharkov, and the Russian troops were defeated shortly.The defence line of the forces under the command of Rabin was quickly broken and there was hardly any organized decent resistance.

This war was regarded by Russia as "the most humiliating defeat since the war began." Chechen leader Kadyrov couldn't help jumping out and publicly calling him a "mediocre man".

Prigozhin, the founder of "Wagner", also mercilessly satirized its "outrageous tactical level". In officialdom, this level of public humiliation is almost equal to "political death".

But Laping was not taken down immediately. Maybe no one was available, or maybe Putin was still waiting to see.

In 2023, he was transferred to the commander of the Leningrad Military District, responsible for the Kursk Defense Line in the northwest. However, in the summer of 2024, something happened to Kursk again.

At one point, Ukrainian troops crossed the border and broke into Russia, causing a national shock. Although the subsequent Russian army successfully blocked the counterattack, Laping's command ability was once again questioned. Two key nodes and two losses, even "comrades-in-arms" can't keep him.

The Russian media "Moscow Times" quoted the analysis as saying that leveling the "poor record" is the consensus of the army, but the reason why he can temporarily "survive" is more because the personnel structure in the army is unbalanced, and it is difficult to find a replacement for a while. However, Putin's patience is clearly exhausted.

This time, "being dismissed on the spot and transferred to a local recruitment consultant" is tantamount to sentencing him to completely out. For an admiral, this arrangement is almost equivalent to "soft exile".

More than leveling: the "big change" of the Russian military command system

Laping's downfall is not an accidental incident, but the epitome of the large-scale "purge" that the high-level command system of the Russian army is undergoing.

If you pull out the list of five pre-war military district commanders, you will find that now only the Moscow military district commander Kuzovlev remains in office.

The commander-in-chief of the army was replaced by the "75-year-old" Mordevich, the Air Force was taken over by Afzalov, and the Navy was handed over to Moiseyev.

These new goalkeepers are a smaller age and a more ¡°clean¡± background, and, more importantly, they¡¯ve mostly fought hard on the Ukrainian battlefield, they¡¯ve ¡°killed a bloodway¡± in real warfare.

And such "after 60" generals as Rabin, DeWalnikov, Zaruzhen, most of them have accumulated experience in low-intensity battles such as Syria, Georgia, but in this modern war in Ukraine have exposed the problem of "not keeping up with the pace".

This "big change of blood" is not just the adjustment of individual people, but the upgrading of the entire high-level combat thinking. Fighting modern warfare requires not only troops and artillery, but also flexible command and information-based combat capabilities.

An old set of "promoting" methods, on the battlefield of drones flying around the sky, the chain of stars, seemed bitter and slow. Putin obviously realized this, began to press the bet on the middle generation.

Not all generals were defeated because of their poor records. For example, former Aerospace Forces commander Sulovikin was quickly marginalized after the "Wagner Mutiny" because of political "uncleanliness".

This shows that behind Putin's change of generals, there are not only military considerations, but also deep considerations of political security.

Putin's calculation: the general, the war scene and the future layout

Rabin was just an iconic figure of ¡°being dealt with,¡± a bigger chesspiece, and in fact Putin was preparing for the shift in the war and the sequel to power.

The pressure on the Ukrainian battlefield is increasing. Although Western assistance is not as rapid as before, the Ukrainian army's tactics are becoming more and more mature.

The Russian army needs a force that can fight tough and protracted battles, and this must first start with the "efficiency improvement" of the command system. Replacing veterans who perform poorly and promoting young, aggressive and adaptable commanders is Putin's direct response to the battlefield situation.

But this is not just as simple as "winning this battle." Putin knows very well that war is only a dimension of regime stability.

He was more concerned about who could continue to maintain the ¡°war-time order¡± in future Russia.General Chief of Staff such as Grazimov, who, despite continued controversy, remained in high positions, most likely because of the needs of the ¡°town square¡± ¨C he was hard enough, and his shifts were too frequent, likely to shake the military heart.

But it was not excluded that the war would slow down a little, and Grazimov would choose to ¡°retire decently¡± to the next generation of generals.

And a new group of middle-generation officers, such as the "field of battle" such as¾ÃÃ÷, may have emerged in this selection mechanism.

Their promotion is not only the recognition of military ability, but also the verification of political loyalty. What Putin needs is a team that can fight, understand politics, and "stand in line" at critical moments.

In fact, this is no longer a mere ¡°wartime shift,¡± but a systematic layout around the future power structure.War provides a most direct screening mechanism, and Putin is using this war to shape his ideal national security architecture.

Laping's sad fate is not only the end of his personal destiny, but also the end of an old era. The military officer system, which relies on the experience of low-intensity conflicts and "veteran qualifications" to mix up at the top, is being thoroughly updated.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is like a purgatory, burning the Russian army out of new skin. There is no second chance for mistakes on the battlefield, and Putin's "changing generals" action is becoming more and more decisive.

It can be said that the youthful, specialized, and militarized transformation of the Russian military command system has begun to shape.The war is not over, but a younger, more understanding of modern war logic Russian army is being reorganized in the war.

This will not only affect the course of the Russian-Ukrainian warfare, but will also profoundly affect the foundations of Russian national security and stability of the regime in the coming years.

The reference information:

Russian media: Alexander Rabin, commander of the Russian Leningrad Military District, was dismissed from his military post-Observer.com 2025-09-21 22:56