On October 10, the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Labour Party, Pyongyang has begun to prepare for this "big day", and satellite maps have captured the moving trajectory of the training cohort.
It's a military parade, but it's actually more like an open geopolitical performance. Should you come or not? Who's coming? How big is the battle?
This is not only a problem that China and Russia need to weigh carefully, but also the focus of keeping the newly appointed South Korean President Lee Jae-myung awake all night. After all, South Korea itself does not want to continue to play the role of "spectator" of this show.
So, what sort of line-up will China send? will the wind direction of the peninsula be quietly changed?
From paper to real choice.
It's not the first time that North Korea has held a military parade, but this time it's different. With 80 years of party age and the current chaotic international situation, Pyongyang hopes not only applause, but to bring the weight of geopolitics to the table through this "red flag".
So, early on, it sent an invitation letter to its two neighbors, China and Russia, but the question arose: it may not necessarily be the one most wanted.
Look at China first. "Blood is thicker than water" between China and the DPRK has never been a slogan, but when it comes to attending such activities, it is important to pay attention to discretion.
From the current high-level intensive diplomatic rhythm of China, the probability of a foreign visit in October is not high, especially under the premise of an APEC meeting at the end of October, it is actually difficult to make a special trip to Pyongyang.
Moreover, the current situation in Northeast Asia is in a delicate re-balance period, sudden visits at the heads of state level are easily misread, and China is more inclined to steadily pursue progress at this time.
According to a number of diplomatic signals, China may send heavy figures, such as the CPC Central Committee's Foreign Relations Ministry, an arrangement that can reflect both respect for the traditional friendship between the DPRK and China, but also send out clear strategic support signals without escalating regional tensions.
In a word, this is not a “reduction specification”, but rather a precise measure of a “righteousness”.
Putin has personally visited Pyongyang last year, and it is logical that this year it is Kim Jong-un’s turn to visit back.
Putin also sent an invitation, and obviously he was unlikely to run again. At this point, if the Russian side could send a representative with both the right to speak within the party and a security background, it would naturally be the most suitable candidate.
At present, the Russian Federation Security Council deputy chairman Medvedev is the most likely, he is not only Putin's old partner, but also the chairman of the ruling party, to participate in the "80th anniversary of the founding party" such an opportunity is appropriate.
In the end, neither of the two neighbors may have come in person, but the high-level representatives sent have been enough to let the outside world understand the diplomatic clichés behind the parade.
Especially for the South Korean government, which wants to become the “dominant of the peninsula”, this “appear to be of no importance, and practical measurement is sufficient” operation makes it more difficult to sit down.
Parade is not a show.
The North Korean parade is not a mere commemorative event. Kim Jong-un has long been unsatisfied with being a "disruptor" on the peninsula, he wants to be a "player" on the play table, or even a "cardmaker".
Therefore, this military parade is actually a big bet on North Korea’s attempt to redefine its position in the regional pattern.
It wants the world to see its “muscles” not to scare anyone, but to tell everyone: I have strength, you can’t ignore me.
Since last year, North Korea has publicly displayed new missiles and drones, and even conducted simulated nuclear strike drills.
The parade is the stage where these things are concentrated, and once senior Chinese-Russian officials are present, the stage turns from a “domestic theater” to an “international showroom”.
On the other hand, North Korea does not intend to put the chip of dialogue on South Korea. After Li Zaiming came to power, he did try to get rid of Yin Xiyue's "pro-American tough" line and released a lot of goodwill, such as calling for the resumption of North-South dialogue and the restart of exchanges and cooperation.
But Pyongyang hasn’t done it at all.The reason is simple, Kim Jong-un doesn’t feel that Seoul can give him what he wants.
Recognize nuclear status? The United States nodded. So North Korea is now playing the trick of "circling South Korea to welcome the United States": I won't talk to you South Korea, I'll go directly to your boss America. Didn't you ignore me? Then I'll show my force and see if you can still sit still.
Kim Jong-un's recent public statement also confirms this point. He said that as long as the United States gives up the "denuclearization illusion", the leaders of the DPRK and the United States can sit down and talk.
This is very straightforward — I am no longer that small country, I am willing to talk, but you must face me.
Li Zaiming's anxiety
For Lee, the pressure of the parade is not only from North Korea’s “sweeping muscles,” but also from a series of chain reactions it could trigger.
As soon as he came to power, he wanted to take a different path from his predecessor, replacing confrontation with moderation and military exercises with dialogue. However, the current situation makes his policy seem somewhat "out of touch".
The biggest concern is the specifics of the Chinese-Russian delegation.When China or Russia sends senior people such as vice-premier or party senior, to the outside world, it is “rewarding” to North Korea.
This will strengthen the image of North Korea’s “great-power diplomacy” in the international community and in turn make South Korea more marginalized.
The Chinese government originally hoped to regain the power of speech in the Korean Peninsula affairs by establishing ties with North Korea, but if North Korea is increasingly inclined to "obstacle Seoul" and interact with China and Russia in depth, then South Korea's role could turn from a "party" to an "observer".
Moreover, the opposition in South Korea has also risen.When North Korea is tough, South Koreans tend to respond more sharply.
If Li Zaiming blindly insists on easing his position, he will easily be criticized for being "weak" or even "pro-DPRK". This makes him not only take into account North Korea's cold response, but also face domestic political pressure when promoting his policy towards the DPRK, which is quite uncomfortable.
The current situation is like a game of chess. North Korea wants to play chess players, China and Russia are key supporters, while South Korea is trying to squeeze into the center from the edge of the chessboard. But the problem is that if there is no substantial influence, no amount of goodwill can become "self-talk".
After this parade, the chess scene on the peninsula may be clearer.
North Korea uses the military parade to show its muscles, pull allies and set up card games; China and Russia send signals and maintain strategic stability through delegations; South Korea, on the other hand, is trying to find its own discourse space. This is not a simple celebration, but a re-ranking of power order.
Who can laugh to the end?You have to see who holds the code in the hand, who can decide the direction of the board.Looking from the bottom, the person who really hits the board, is still watching in the distance.