October 10 will mark the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Labour Party. Unlike before, this year's commemorative activities are earlier in the field, and the focus is on one question: Who will stand on the standing table at Pyongyang's Kim Jong-un Square?
South Korean government sources disclosed to a number of Korean media that Seoul's intelligence department has confirmed through satellite photos that Pyongyang is conducting a typical military parade rehearsal, including queue training, equipment dispatching, mobile missile platform approach, etc., and the characteristics are highly consistent with previous major celebrations. Although the DPRK has not officially announced the military parade plan, there is almost no doubt about it.
The real cause of tension in South Korea is not whether the missile vehicle tires are replaced, but North Korea has already issued an invitation to the leaders of many countries at the beginning of the year, this parade has been given a clear intention of foreign contact.
It’s not a simple ceremonial issue, but a diplomatic army over speech, rankings and even geo-connectivity.
Who will join Russia?
Whether there will be high-level interaction between China and the DPRK is a courtesy choice on the surface, but in essence it is the result of a political evaluation.
In terms of reality, China’s top leaders have attended international conferences several times in September, and will also travel to San Francisco at the end of October to attend the APEC summit and likely to attend the G20 summit. In such intense foreign affairs arrangements temporarily free time to visit the DPRK, it is unlikely, especially if to arrange a high-quality state visit, and need weeks in advance to complete the process of diplomatic coordination, security preparation, policy linking, and so far there is no substantial progress.
However, this does not mean that China will not send delegates.In reference to the 70th anniversary of North Korea's victory in 2015, China sent Zhang De Jiang, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, to attend, whose party level and political percentage has been higher than that of the general foreign minister or deputy prime minister.If the theme of the DPRK is "80th anniversary of party building", China may also be dominated by the party affairs system, attended by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee or the relevant senior level of the CPC Ministry.
Russia seems to have more space.While Putin visited Pyongyang last year and again invited to visit Russia at Beijing’s meeting with Kim Jong-un this year, the conventional judgment is that he will not refuse to visit the DPRK.
More frequently mentioned is Medvedev, who served as vice chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and chairman of the ruling party "United Russia", with a dual status in the party administration, in political ceremonies highly matched with the theme of the party's founding day. Even if ultimately not present, Russia is likely to arrange a heavy representative to maintain the sense of presence and the right to play in the issue of North Korea.
It is worth noting that as of late September, the DPRK did not disclose any arrangements for a meeting with the foreign ministers of China and Russia, nor did the Russian President's Press Bureau disclose any relevant information. If the prime minister's plan for a visit to the DPRK exists, it should have been released long ago. The likelihood of high-level representatives being present is rising, but it is unlikely that the situation will evolve into a "double head" stand.
Kim Jong-un’s new diplomacy
While the outside world is focusing on who will come to Pyongyang, North Korea is changing its positioning.
At the beginning of September, the DPRK officially announced its latest diplomatic strategy, defining three major goals: first, building the DPRK into a "central country of regional diplomacy"; Second, take a pre-emptive response to those opponents who have long threatened national security; Third, guide the rapidly changing regional and global situation and shape an environment conducive to North Korea.
This is very different from the past "passive defense" and "isolation of self-protection" in North Korea's diplomacy, Pyongyang is trying to create an image of a "geo-mediator" with an independent agenda, actively building platforms, engaging in dialogue, and even selecting objects for exchanges.
This also explains why North Korea is now silent in the face of the demonstrations of Seoul, but often creates a “great power gas field” through parades, messaging activities and foreign speeches.
On the eve of the North Korean leader's visit to China in September, he made a rare statement to the outside world, saying that as long as the United States gave up its illusion of denuclearization of the DPRK, the leaders of the DPRK and the United States could meet. He clearly pointed out that North Korea "will not abandon its nuclear program because of the lifting of sanctions", which is not a bargaining chip, but a strategic cornerstone.
The intention of these remarks is not difficult to understand: North Korea regards nuclear weapons as its "ballast stone" in the geopolitical game, and only negotiations between major powers are worthy of using this card. For the DPRK, the object of dialogue can only be the United States, China and Russia, not "other pawns on the chessboard".
Lee is in trouble.
This certain shift in North Korea is very challenging for the newly assembled Lee in the Ming government.
Unlike Yong Zee's predecessor's radical pro-U.S. line, Li has repeatedly expressed his willingness to "reconcil" with North Korea and promote "practical diplomacy".In the campaign period, he promised to resume the King Kong tourism program, support humanitarian aid, and hope to break the cycle of hostility.
However, judging from Pyongyang's response, these goodwill have not yet constituted a policy breakthrough. The DPRK still failed to respond to mechanism restoration, hotline communication, military dialogue, etc. Instead, it constantly released signals of non-cooperation through nuclear policy statements, tough speeches, and military parade preparations.
The problem is that this is not Lee Jae-myung's "immature negotiation technology", but that North Korea has regarded "North-South contact" as a low-value interaction. All the suggestions put forward by Lee Jae-myung have not jumped out of the category of "restoring the old model", while North Korea has already shifted its diplomatic focus to "strategic dialogue among sovereign states".
In other words, North Korea will no longer adjust its policies to improve relations with the South and North, and Li is also difficult to open up the situation with moderate gestures. In the parade-style high-density political symbols, if China and Russia send heavy representatives, and South Korea is absent or unable to participate, this reality of "marginalization" will be broadcast globally.
For Seoul, this is not only an absence on the diplomatic stage, but also a weakening of the power of speech on the peninsula.
Signal on the viewing platform
This military parade of the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Party is ostensibly a commemoration of history, but in fact it is a well-planned geopolitical public relations war.
North Korea is trying to turn the identity of the “host country” in its own way into a symbol of the “leader” – who wants to come, who dares to stand on the table, who is excluded, are all predictions about the future game pattern.
If China and Russia send high-level political leaders, it will not only strengthen Pyongyang's image as an "ally circle", but also indirectly endorse North Korea's new strategy. Especially at a time when the contact between the United States and the DPRK has been stagnant for a long time and the relations between the ROK and the DPRK have been frozen, such diplomatic signals will be amplified and interpreted, affecting the situation on the peninsula in the next few months.
Missiles on the parade ground can hide technical parameters, but people on the viewing platform can't hide political attitudes.
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