Source: Shangguan News
Author of this article: Tintin Shanli Snow
French President Emmanuel Macron appointed Le Corneille as new prime minister on 9th, replacing former prime minister Beurou, who resigned after failing to pass a vote of confidence in the National Assembly.
Former French Prime Minister Bayrou became the first prime minister in the history of the Fifth Republic to resign due to the failure of a vote of confidence, which not only marked the bankruptcy of his fiscal austerity plan, but also meant that the crisis of institutional imbalance and social tearing in France surfaced in an all-round way. With the fall of Bayrou's cabinet, French President Macron has successively replaced seven prime ministers during his nine-year term, and the French prime minister has become a "consumable" and the president's "administrative glove". Looking ahead, it may still be difficult for French politics to be stable for a long time.
The fiscal austerity scheme failed
The total amount of the austerity plan was approximately €43.8 billion, and the core contents included cutting two public holidays, freezing part of welfare spending and increasing taxes. These measures were intended to respond to the EU and international markets' doubts about the sustainability of French debt, trying to rebuild public finance credibility, but in the high cost of living, welfare became a social glue in France, these measures were almost equal to touching society's sensitive nerves. For the working class, cutting holidays and welfare meant further deterioration of life; for the enterprise community, tax increases were interpreted as damaging competitiveness; while the middle class was more concerned that reforms would exacerbate social inequality. The result was that the left wing in parliament (
Secondly, Beru's desperate political gamble accelerated failure. Faced with a highly polarized and fragmented parliament, he did not choose the regular budget review procedure to gather similarities and resolve differences and win support. Instead, he used Article 49.3 of the Constitution to actively bind the financial plan with the government's confidence vote. This last stand strategy is originally intended to force parliamentarians, especially political opponents, to choose between "supporting reform" and "overthrowing the government", either forced to submit, or backed by the notoriety of non-cooperation to affect their political reputation. However, this high-stakes move is doomed to failure in a parliamentary environment without consensus.
Furthermore, the deepest reasons are the weak economic recovery in France, the fiscal deficit and high debt, and the difficult livelihoods of the people. The current French fiscal deficit and public debt reached 5.8% of GDP and 114%, respectively, far above the 3% and 60% ceilings set by the eurozone, making control of deficits and debt growth an urgent task of the government. and the implementation of austerity policies is undoubtedly driving the cheese of all classes, coupled with the slow economic recovery, the pressure on people's cost of living is huge, and the actual purchasing power growth is weak.
Finally, the accumulation of social protests has generally put pressure on the Beirut government. In recent years, in France, the frequent outbursts of large-scale protests, such as pension reforms, education policies, immigration issues, have made the “blocking of everything” movement a collective export of underlying people’s dissatisfaction. In this context, austerity policies are widely viewed as “transfering costs to the general public”. Beirut has not only failed to resolve the protests, but has been labeled “betraying the people” and paid the political price of its departure.
The Prime Minister’s role in “Sins”
In recent years, especially since 2022, the French politics have been presented with the situation of “the president of the iron, the prime minister of the water” and the French prime minister has become “easy to consume”: Bourne has resigned due to the failure of the pension reform, Attar has become a transitional figure because of the policy, Barnier’s term has ended just three months before the implementation, and Beirut is back in the budget.
First, the "scapegoating" of the role of the Prime Minister. France's political system is semi-presidential, with the president in charge of foreign affairs and national defense, and the prime minister in charge of internal affairs, which should have formed a certain division of labor and checks and balances. However, since the constitutional amendment in 2000 established a "five-year" presidential term and synchronized the presidential election with the parliamentary election, this balance has been gradually broken. The victory of the presidential election often directly leads his party to win the subsequent parliamentary election, thus holding the majority of the parliament. This breaks the traditional "left-right co-governance". The president not only occupies a dominant position in foreign affairs, but also monopolizes power in internal affairs because of the majority of parliament. The prime minister gradually becomes an extension of the president's will and a "political glove" that can be discarded. Once the policy that the president wants to implement is frustrated, the political crisis or public opinion deteriorates seriously, the president can shirk his responsibility by replacing the prime minister, thus maintaining his authority. Attal, Barnier and Bayrou stepped down one after another, which is the product of this institutional logic.
Second, the structural dilemma of the serious fragmentation and polarization of French politics and the "three parts of the world" of parliament. After the 2024 legislative elections, the French political arena has become fragmented and polarized. The left-wing "New Popular Front", the centrist "Baath Alliance", and the far-right "National Alliance" have checked and balanced each other, resulting in the government being unable to obtain a stable majority and being forced to repeatedly use Article 49.3 of the Constitution to force bills, such as Bornet's use of this clause as many as 23 times during his 18-month term as prime minister. Although this practice promotes the implementation of policies in the short term, maintains the operation of the government, and conforms to the political will of the president, it intensifies the opposition between the parliament and the government, and between the government and the people in the long term. The government may fall at any time due to a vote of no confidence, and the term of office of the Prime Minister is naturally difficult to last long.
Third, focus on the interests of their respective parties and lack a political culture of compromise. Compared to some other European countries, there is a general lack of culture of compromise among French political parties. Even in the absence of an absolute majority, political parties are reluctant to form a stable alliance across the left and right divisions. At present, all parties are focusing on the 2027 presidential election, preferring to maintain confrontation than to cooperate with their opponents to share responsibilities and offend their respective voters and fans. Faced with a president who can directly decide whether to stay or not, and in a parliament under uncooperative political sides, the French Prime Minister is at risk of falling at any time.
Fourth, the ambition of the French leaders is under pressure for social reforms. On the one hand, as one of the main heartbones and axes of the European Union, the French leaders and people have a strong ambition for international affairs, and this requires their own strong economic and social strength support. On the other hand, the French economy has a long-term growth weakness, fiscal deficits and high public debt, are forced to reform pensions and other welfare systems, implement fiscal austerity and other difficult reforms, while the French people's strong rights awareness makes the reform move difficult. As the main driver of the reform, there are two "grandmothers" of the president and parliament, under which there are fiercely protesting people, among which the prime minister naturally becomes a high-risk position.
The future needs a new balance.
Looking forward to the future direction of French politics, it is still confusing.
In the short term, the Budget has become a life-and-death test. The first challenge of the new Prime Minister Le Corny is to push the budget through before the end of the year, which is the key to whether France can maintain its financial credit and political stability. Unlike Bayrou's desperate adventure, Le Corny has expressed his willingness to start negotiations, and Macron has also released a signal of giving more autonomy. But even if the budget is passed by fluke, Le Corny still faces the danger of being overturned by a motion of no confidence at any time.
In the medium term, parliamentary instability will continue to plague the parliamentary pattern of the Prime Minister’s government, which will be difficult to change in the short term, political parties will refuse to compromise, the government will lack a stable majority, and the prime minister’s position will still be at risk. If Congress is again dissolved, the far-right “National League” could grow further, even close to the edge of governing power.
Long-term observation shows that the call for institutional reform is rising. Frequent changes of prime ministers have exposed the fatigue of "over-presidencialization" in France. The excessive power of the president and the fragmentation and polarization of the parliament have made the prime minister the most vulnerable role. Academic circles generally call for the introduction of proportional representation in parliament to force political parties to learn alliances and compromises. At the same time, weakening the power of the president and strengthening the role of parliament in the appointment of the prime minister are also regarded as future institutional options. The key to France's future lies not only in who is the prime minister, but also in whether it can find a new balance between presidential centralism and parliamentary pluralism.
(Author: Director of the Center for European Studies at Fujian University, EU Professor Jean Monnet, President of the Shanghai European Society, Regional PhD student at Shanghai Foreign Language University)