Source: Global Times

At the invitation of the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, South Korean Foreign Minister Zhao Zhao will begin a visit to China on the 17th. This is the first visit to China since Zhao Zhao took office, and it is also the first bilateral foreign ministerial meeting between the two countries since the establishment of the new government of South Korea.

In recent years, some positive factors have emerged indirectly. The South Korean government has announced that it will implement a visa-free entry policy for Chinese group tourists from the end of this month. In the large shopping malls such as Lookout Free Shops in Seoul, the Chinese emblems are becoming awake again, and staff are well prepared to welcome the arrival of Chinese tourists. This scene reminds us of the prosperity of the peak of Chinese-Korean tourists. More moving is the recent rescue of Chinese fishermen, the South Korean Rinuawa Sea Police Department chief Li Zhao, has received the officials of the two Koreas and the civilian unity of mourning and respect, further illustrating China-Korea as an unmovable neighbor, the people of the two countries have a natural friendship.

South Korea's Foreign Minister ZhaoÏÔ

The South Korean Foreign Minister's first visit to China this time "not sticking to convention" reflects the active willingness of the ROK to improve and develop relations with China from the political level. Recently, the United States has put pressure on South Korea on issues such as tariffs and investment allocation, which has made South Korea further realize the importance of balanced diplomacy. In the eyes of the outside world, Zhao Xian's visit to China highlights pragmatic considerations: First, stabilize China-ROK relations through high-level communication and find a buffer for possible US-ROK economic and trade frictions; The second is to release positive signals and promote China-ROK cooperation to blossom and bear fruit in new areas; The third is to pave the way for the upcoming informal meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders.

As an important mechanism for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, APEC provides China and South Korea with a broad stage for deepening cooperation and promoting common prosperity at the regional and global levels.In the face of the current challenges of unilateralism and protectionism, China and South Korea, as supporters and beneficiaries of free trade and economic globalization, can fully take this opportunity to jointly advocate the spirit of open and inclusive regional cooperation, maintain the stability of the industrial supply chain, oppose protectionism and "disconnecting chains", and contribute positive energy to regional economic development.

Since the establishment of bilateral relations in 1992, China-Korea bilateral relations have achieved cross-cutting development. The two countries have formed a highly complementary economic structure, China has been South Korea's largest trading partner, largest export market and largest import source country for many years in a row, South Korea is also one of China's most important trade and investment partners. The common interests and deep cooperation foundations have become the "capstone" of the basic aspects of stabilizing bilateral relations. Although the international situation has changed, the relations between the two countries have also faced some challenges and interference, but the nature of mutual benefit and win-win has not changed, the geographical proximity and cultural conditions have not changed, and the people's desire for friendly exchanges has not changed.

At present, China-ROK relations are in a critical period of connecting the past with the future. The key to promoting stable and far-reaching bilateral relations to a new level lies in implementing the important consensus reached by the two heads of state. The two sides need to look at and develop bilateral relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, and adhere to the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. In particular, joint efforts should be made to eliminate external interference. The international situation is complex and changeable, and external factors in the regional pattern sometimes become variables affecting China-ROK relations. The more this is the case, the more the two sides should maintain their strength, focus on the fundamental well-being of the two peoples and the overall interests of the region, and avoid being kidnapped or led astray by third-party factors. It is the responsibility of China and South Korea as mature and responsible countries to independently make diplomatic decisions that are in their own interests.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung data map

For a period of time, an extreme anti-China reversal instigated by the far-right forces of South Korea has seriously eroded the basis of friendly public opinion between the two countries. South Korean President Li has publicly criticized anti-China rallies tomorrow, and Seoul police have also taken restrictive measures in accordance with the law on anti-China rallies in Minghua. We hope that the South Korean government can continue to take practical actions to effectively protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens in South Korea, and actively guide the establishment of an objective and rational Chinese perception. South Korean mainstream public opinion has a greater responsibility to make it clear to the public that China's friendship and win-win cooperation is the mainstream for 33 years, and China's development is an opportunity

The South Korean Foreign Minister's visit to China is an important opportunity. It is expected that the two sides can communicate in depth, enhance understanding, accumulate mutual trust, focus on cooperation, properly handle differences, and create a good atmosphere for the next higher-level interaction. China and South Korea are neighbors that cannot be moved away, and they are also win-win partners. It is expected that the two sides will take the recent benign interaction as an opportunity to promote the stable development of bilateral relations.

Previously reported:

South Korea falls into "anti-China fanaticism", the Koreans go crazy and the US military can't stop it

¡°South Korea Special Mission: Almost all Chinese people have mentioned the ¡®anti-Chinese¡¯ sentiment in South Korea and asked the South Korean side to take measures.¡± ¨C this is the headline of the report of the Korean Associated Press and the Korean National Daily. In other words, Beijing has noticed the rise of anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea society, so that whether officials or scholars, visiting the South Korean delegation, ¡°almost high-profile¡± talk about the issue.

In today¡¯s international community, very few countries have such a comprehensive and fierce hostility to China as South Korea. In South Korea¡¯s public opinion, ¡°anti-China¡± has not only become a popular language, but has progressively evolved into a ¡°social consensus¡± across parties, generations and classes. According to a joint poll conducted by the Central Daily and the East Asian Institute in June 2025, more than 66% of South Koreans have a negative view of China, and the proportion of young people is as high as 8%. This number not only exceeds hostility to Japan, but also exceeds warnings toward North Korea. In other words, in contemporary South Korean society, China has replaced the long-term enemy, former colonial ruler of Japan, becoming ¡°the least popular neighbour.¡±

South Korean President Lee.

According to the Korean National Daily and the Associated Press, with regard to the recent anti-China demonstrations and discrimination against foreigners in South Korea, South Korean President Li pointed out on May 12, local time, that similar incidents have damaged the South Korean national image, and that necessary measures should be taken thoroughly to prevent it from happening again.

It can even be said that anti-China in South Korea has surpassed policy differences, became a social phenomenon of fanaticism, becoming a subject that no diplomatic dictum can bypass.As East German Women's University Chinese Research Department professor Lee Dong-Too said: "The Korean people's perception of China is rooted in deep-rooted structural resentment, this emotion is difficult to change easily."

Why did South Korea take this step?

The Koreans went crazy, and the US military couldn't stop them

Let¡¯s start with a typical case that can almost be seen as a ¡°Korean anti-Chinese fanatic textbook.¡±

Time back to the end of 2024, South Korea¡¯s public opinion suddenly erupted into a shocking ¡°inside scenes¡±: During Yongxiang¡¯s decree implementation on December 3, about 90 people were secretly detained in the training facility of the South Korean National Election Commission.

The news was quickly heated by South Korean right-wing media and YouTube bloggers. Extreme-right broadcaster Shenyang, with millions of fans, released a video on Christmas Day claiming that these ¡°arrested people¡± were actually Chinese hackers who manipulated the South Korean election. He removed the so-called ¡°evidence¡±: a vague speculation in a weekly article, interpreted by him as a iron proof of China¡¯s interference with South Korean democracy.

Soon, the ¡°spy battle¡± spread from the internet to mainstream politics. Right-wing newspapers published columns calling these people ¡°Chinese hacking gangs¡±; former Prime Minister Hu Jintao even commented on the online media ¡°Finance Today¡± and asked the government to thoroughly investigate the matter.

The peak of the spread of false information appeared in a January 16 report by Sky Daily, which cited ¡°US military sources¡± saying that 99 ¡°Chinese spies¡± had been transferred to the U.S. military base in Okinawa, Pyeongchang, Japan.The media followed up on January 18, reporting that the detained Chinese confessed to the U.S. intelligence department to use artificial intelligence technology to write web reviews to manipulate South Korean public opinion.

On January 17, the right-wing South Korean Sky Daily published an article claiming that 99 Chinese were arrested at the South Korean National Election Commission Training College and deported to a U.S. military base in Japan.

At the impeachment hearing at Yongxiang, lawyer Pe Thun-han solemnly stated that these ¡°spies¡± had been sent to the U.S. military base in Okinawa, Japan, and ¡°admitted¡± to interfering in the 2020 general election in Korea. Another defender, former Constitutional Court judge Zhao Da Wei, added: ¡°To prevent the Communist Left from taking power through fraud, the rule of law is imperative ¨C these conspiracy theories originally spread by the right-wing YouTube blogger have now spread to the scene of major national affairs in South Korea.

At this time, the plot has been completely divorced from the logic of reality. The U.S. military stationed in South Korea has repeatedly publicly denied it, saying that the relevant statements are "purely fictional"; The South Korean police have repeatedly refuted rumors. However, Sky Daily still insists that the report is "99% true", and its supporters are even more angry, thinking that "only their report is the truth" and "except the right-wing media, everything else is lying".

This absurd case reveals an important fact: South Korea¡¯s anti-China sentiment is not a spontaneous emotional outbreak, but a set of narratives that are organized, distributed and exploited.

Storytelling: Packaging complex political crises into spy war dramas, creating situations where good and evil are distinct. Externalization: Transfer the domestic legitimacy crisis to "Chinese spies" and turn the regime dilemma into a "national security" issue. Politicization: When conspiracy theories are moved into politics, they jump from online rumors to national discourse.

In other words, the reason why the story of "Chinese spies manipulating Korean elections" is popular lies not in its truth, but in its practical value in Korean politics. It is a weapon for right-wing politicians to mobilize supporters, a sharp weapon for right-wing media to harvest traffic, and a "panacea" used by Korean society to explain complex dilemmas.

The deep roots of hostility

The anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea¡¯s society did not break out overnight, but was gradually accumulated, fermented and eventually solidified into a ¡°collective common sense¡± under the impetus of a series of events, according to the Korean people¡¯s own analysis, which included four iconic events, which had a decisive impact on South Korea¡¯s public opinion: the 2016 Sad deployment, the 2019 Hong Kong wave, the 2020 New Corona epidemic, and China¡¯s so-called ¡°cultural imperialism.¡±

If security, politics and epidemics are the real triggers of South Korea¡¯s anti-China sentiment, then ¡°imperialist¡± memory at the cultural level is the deepest psychological root.

Koreans accused China of "trying to incorporate Korean culture into the Chinese historical system" and counted "acts" like a few treasures-for example, kimchi, a representative Korean dish, was claimed to originate from Chinese kimchi; The poet Yin Dongzhu was actually marked as "Korean" on Baidu; Hanbok was actually listed as one of Chinese costumes... At the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, when a Chinese Korean actor appeared at the opening ceremony dressed in traditional national costumes, Korean public opinion immediately boiled, accusing China of "stealing Korean culture"; South Korean short track speed skaters were punished for foul, which even alarmed four South Korean presidential candidates to issue a statement condemning it. "Like a lit match, it detonated the long-standing anti-China sentiment in South Korea and spread it like gas smoke."

To understand why South Korean society is so easy to accept anti-China narrative, it must go back to its historical and cultural context. For a long time, South Korean historical narrative emphasized the "China hegemony" image, textbooks long emphasized ancient China's "sacred state posture" and "repressive history", highlighted the records of ancient China's multiple aggression of North Korea, but debilitated China's active role in the defense of foreign contempt, not to mention China's long-term interaction in culture and trade. For example, the help of the DPRK to fight Japan's tinnitus, is often simplified to "interference in their own interests"; the contribution of the Chinese classical, Chinese language education is gradually debilitated.

This historical vision of ¡°victim-aggressor¡± is deeply imprinted in the collective memory of the Korean people. As former President Lu Huang said, ¡°China has been a country that has invaded Korea hundreds of times in history,¡± this statement, although extremely unscrupulous, reflects the general perception of South Korea. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in Japan: although the colonial rule of Japan has caused great trauma to South Korea, the reality of Korean culture globalization and security cooperation has slowed the younger generation¡¯s rejection of Japan; in contrast, the negative impression of China has been strengthened with teaching material, media reports and social reality.

Under the U.S.-led security framework, South Korean society has long been infused with fear of ¡°red infiltration.¡± Today, as the North Korean issue is gradually marginalized, this Cold War discourse has shifted to hostility to China: The Cold War discourse about ¡°red elements¡± infiltrating free societies and attempting to subvert is clearly visible in today¡¯s Korean conservative discourse against China. Common arguments include China¡¯s political influence on the left-wing elites such as Moon Jae-in, and Chinese capital is gradually taking control of the South Korean entertainment industry.

What deserves more attention is the intergenerational differences. Although the older generation of Koreans are anti-Communist because of the Cold War mentality, they still have certain respect and emotional ties for Chinese character culture and Confucian tradition, and regard China as a "gentle giant". They have experienced the trade opportunities brought by China's economic rise, so their attitudes are relatively complicated. In contrast, the younger generation grew up in the period of rapid economic development and prosperity in South Korea. They looked at the development of the country and society more self-centered, and thought that western-style thinking and logical theory were more suitable for them. In the process of growing up, they have been repeatedly instilled with the "China threat theory", and they have not received Chinese character education. They lack a sense of closeness to Chinese culture, and their impression of China is often bound to negative labels such as pollution, COVID-19 pandemic and authoritarianism.

Mechanisms under real pressure.

If historical narrative and cultural conflict have sown the psychological seeds of hostility to China for Korean society, then the actual economic dilemma and social pressure are the nutrients that make this seed germinate and spread quickly. In the past decade, the downturn of South Korea's domestic economy, the solidification of classes and the frustration of youth groups have all accumulated. In this situation, China has become the most logical and "convenient" scapegoat.

In the 2000s, China-South Korea economic relations were described as typical "complementary cooperation": China needed South Korea's high-end manufacturing and technology, and South Korea relied on China's huge market and low-cost production network. However, with the upgrading of China's manufacturing industry and the breakthrough of technological innovation, this relationship has rapidly shifted from complementarity to competition. In recent years, many Chinese companies are rapidly catching up with Korean companies and seizing market share globally. From electronics to shipbuilding, from artificial intelligence to electric vehicles, Chinese brands are posing a threat to Korean conglomerates.

For the general public, the complex global industrial chain is compressed into an intuitive feeling: China is threatening South Korea¡¯s livelihoods. So the hostility toward China is no longer limited to abstract cultural and historical levels, but directly linked to daily life. The Korea Times notes that China is seen as a more imminent threat than traditional warnings against Japan ¨C Beijing¡¯s political, economic and cultural influence has penetrated into the daily lives of South Koreans.

In addition to economic competition, cross-border public issues further stimulated anti-China sentiment in South Korean society. In 2018, a web petition called on the South Korean government to investigate China¡¯s cross-border air pollution responsibility, and in a matter of weeks it received more than 270,000 signatures. In 2019, after China denied South Korea¡¯s air pollution originated in China, conservative groups protested in front of the Chinese embassy in Seoul. Though the scientific community still disagreed about the source of fog, in public opinion, the ¡°smog from China¡± almost became a conclusion. The gray sky on the streets, seen by many South Koreans as the most direct evidence of China¡¯s influence.

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, South Korean conservatives fiercely criticized the Moon Jae in government for "failing to ban Chinese flights from entering the country in time" and blamed the so-called "submission to China" for the ineffective epidemic prevention. Under this narrative, the epidemic is not only a public health crisis, but also interpreted as a "national security threat brought by China". This also explains why "Novel Coronavirus" is often ranked among the public's top impressions of China in Korean polls.

It reflects, to a certain extent, the general perception of the South Korean people about China Image Source: The project ¡°Affronting China: South Korean and European public attitudes as the basis for effective policy cooperation¡±, funded by the South Korean Foundation.

If economic competition and cross-border issues between China and South Korea explain the dissatisfaction at the social level, the hostility of the younger generation gives the strongest impetus to anti-China sentiment. Young people in South Korea have been faced with multiple difficulties for a long time, such as high housing prices, few opportunities and narrow rising channels-all of which make young people full of resentment, and China has just become an ideal target to release frustration. On the one hand, the media constantly emphasizes China's rapid economic growth and rising international status, which is in sharp contrast to the present situation in South Korea; On the other hand, young Koreans find that their industry, market and even cultural discourse seem to be "eroded" by China. As a result, youth groups externalize their anger and turn their dissatisfaction with their own social structure into hostility towards China.

It is worth noting that South Korea is the only country among the 14 countries surveyed by Pew in 2020 where "young people are more hostile to China than older people." 80% of young respondents have a negative attitude towards China, which is not only higher than the older generation in South Korea, but also much higher than their western peers. In other words, South Korea's anti-China sentiment does not come from the old-fashioned elderly group, but is dominated by the younger generation with the most future influence.

"There are some similarities between the Korean case and the different responses of countries around the world to the 'China threat'. Its core commonality is that people's frustration with elite politics and existing economic and social problems is being vented through these debates about China," analyzed Japan's Diplomat magazine.

Behind the scenes: Who is manipulating the hostility?

This hostility is not spontaneous, but the result of politization and institutionalization. The anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea has spread from marginal public opinion to mainstream narrative and gradually institutionalized into national discourse, behind which three major drivers are inseparable: domestic conservative political parties, right-wing media and networking platforms, and the structural pressure imposed by the United States. They together form a ¡°chain of making hostility¡± that unites the originally loose, fragmented emotions into a national strategic trend.

In South Korea's polarized political structure, conservatives are best at turning anti-China sentiment into resources for election mobilization. In recent years, the main conservative party "National Power Party" and the Yoon Seok-yue camp have repeatedly described China as an "external enemy threatening *." The National Power Party's policy white paper clearly demonstrates its tough stance towards China, calls for a tougher response to China's "historical distortion", strengthens the U.S.-South Korea alliance, resists the "praise" of China's resistance to U.S. aggression and aid Korea, and advocates a more "confident" China policy guided by national interests.

Among the widely disseminated conspiracy theories, China was accused of stealing the 2020 South Korean general election; during the outbreak, conservatives vehemently criticized the Moon Jae-in administration for "failing to block flights from China", calling it "submission to China"; Yinxiang even openly referred to the new crown as "Wuhan virus", reinforcing the narrative of "epidemic = China's responsibility." At the end of 2024, Yinxiang cited vague allegations of "Chinese espionage" as the basis; in the impeachment crisis, Yinxiang's defense team also repeatedly openly suggested that "Chinese spies manipulated the Korean elections."

As a leader of a country, Yin Xi Jinping¡¯s remarks have had a terrible impact, and the president claimed in his speech that it was a ¡°Chinese spy,¡± said Wang Henghai, director of the China Research Institute at Seoul Han Yang University, ¡°When such remarks come from the mouths of the country¡¯s most influential figure such as the highest leader, the influence goes far beyond the small circle of extreme supporters.¡±This February 14, a South Korean man dressed as ¡°Captain America¡± attempted to break into the Chinese embassy in South Korea and was stopped by the police on the spot.

This rhetoric is not accidental, but an intentional strategy. For conservatives, the anti-China narrative can not only cater to the emotions of young people, but also strengthen the necessity of the "Korea-US alliance" on security issues. By creating the "China threat", conservative politicians externalize the failure of internal governance on the one hand, and win the political legitimacy of "defending national security" for themselves on the other.

If the politicians are ¡°directors¡±, then the right-wing media and the self-media are the ¡°expansion¡± of the play. South Korean right-wing news websites, Sky Daily, and other media, as well as influential YouTube bloggers, together fabricate a ¡°evil China¡± public opinion space. From Korean costume, cooking to the pieces in the antique drama, the right-wing media continues to interpret the cultural friction as ¡°Chinese cultural imperialism¡±. South Korean netizens form an information hall in the network forums and video platforms, anti-Chinese narratives in which are repeatedly strengthened, gradually becoming a ¡°common sense¡±.

Of course, to truly understand the structural background of South Korea¡¯s anti-China sentiment, we must not ignore the role of the United States.Since the ¡°Thad incident¡±, the United States has put increasing pressure on the security and strategic layer in the face of South Korea, demanding that Seoul give up its strategic ambiguity, and clearly choose a marginal position between China and the United States.

In the past, the dual-track thinking of "security depends on the United States and economy depends on China" provided South Korea with diplomatic flexibility. However, American think tanks and Washington policy circles constantly criticize this "fence-sitting". For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies of the United States publicly urged Seoul to "recommit to the Korea-US alliance". The Biden administration has also asked Seoul to play a more active role in Indo-Pacific mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The United States has stepped up its public opinion and academic penetration into South Korea. Think tanks and media supported by American funds have continuously strengthened the "China threat theory" in Korean public discourse. Many Korean scholars and journalists have received training or received funding under the framework of Washington, making the anti-China stance in the policy circle further institutionalized. Conservative protesters waved South Korean and American flags while supporting the ousted Yoon Seok-yue. Its subtext is: Being close to China may lead South Korea to alienate the United States. This kind of zero-sum thinking is not uncommon in today's increasingly polarized Korean political discussions and opinion polls.

Korea's policy coordination score with China and the United States Image source Japanese Diplomatic Magazine

It can be said that the United States is the external designer of this "anti-China sentiment project". Historical grievances, economic anxiety and intergenerational conflicts in Korean society could have led to complex and diverse public opinions. However, under the guidance of the strategic thrust of the United States, anti-China has become the only outlet, and other possible explanations have gradually been suppressed.

Conservative politicians provide political motivation, right-wing media and social platforms provide public opinion channels, and the United States provides a strategic framework with external pressure. These three forces merge, making anti-China has become South Korea's "political correctness", even pro-China or pragmatic politicians, difficult to reverse.

The Double Sword: South Korea¡¯s Strategic Difficulties

The rapid expansion of anti-China sentiment in South Korea undoubtedly brings short-term dividends to conservative politicians and right-wing media: it can inspire nationalist passions, consolidate ballots, and also bring significant traffic to certain media platforms. However, from the national level, this fanaticism is more like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it facilitates South Korean political mobilization; on the other hand, it deeply weakens South Korea¡¯s diplomatic spatial and strategic autonomy.

In the decades after the end of the Cold War, South Korea has gained considerable flexibility in "strategic ambiguity", allowing South Korea to have both sides between China and the United States. However, as anti-China sentiment becomes the mainstream of society, this ambiguous space is rapidly disappearing. Even liberal politicians who tend to be pragmatic have to cater to anti-China sentiment in the election, otherwise they will be labeled as "pro-China" by their opponents. In this atmosphere, any policy that promotes easing with China may be regarded as "betraying public opinion". For example, during his presidential campaign, Lee Jae-myung said that South Korea "should sink Chinese fishing boats that violate South Korea's territorial waters".

On the other hand, while conservatives use anti-Chinese rhetoric to win support, once in power, they must also face real diplomatic and economic difficulties.The result is that they move into the valley of the decline in their relations with China: neither can they openly ease, nor can they bear the price of comprehensive confrontation.

In other words, South Korea¡¯s foreign policy is being kidnapped by populist anti-China sentiment, which makes it difficult for Seoul to maintain flexible strategic choices when foreign policy becomes domestic.

The high degree of interweaving between South Korea and China's economy means that anti-China policies can't go without paying the price. China has long been South Korea's largest trading partner, and the two countries are closely linked in industrial chains such as semiconductors, chemicals, automobiles and batteries. Any attempt at decoupling will directly impact South Korea's exports and employment. As a result, South Korea can't really decouple, and it has to assume a confrontational posture politically, forming an embarrassing situation of "hard mouth and guilty conscience".

From a security perspective, anti-China sentiment has not only failed to make South Korea safer, but has aggravated regional tensions. Excessive hostility to China may weaken South Korea's room for manoeuvre on the security issue of the peninsula. If Seoul completely turns to Washington, it is tantamount to giving up the possibility of influencing Pyongyang through Beijing. In addition, as the game between the United States and China intensifies, the politicization of anti-China sentiment in South Korea makes it easier for it to be included in the forefront of the Indo-Pacific strategy by the United States. This means that South Korea not only has to bear the cost of confrontation with China, but may also passively take sides on issues that are not core interests, such as Taiwan Province and the South China Sea. Seoul is more and more like the frontier position of the United States on the chessboard in Northeast Asia, rather than a middle power with independent choices.

In addition to diplomatic and economic aspects, anti-China fanaticism is also tearing Korean society internally. The differences between conservatives and progressives on China issues have further amplified the existing social antagonism. Any voice that tries to promote a pragmatic China policy will be quickly drowned in the tide of nationalism.

As Professor Kim Xiuigu warned, ¡°Anti-Chinese fanaticism is a victory for the political elite, but a failure for national interests.¡±

On the surface, South Korea seems to be demonstrating its national identity and autonomy by being hostile to China; But from a deeper perspective, this hostility itself is the result of being manipulated and amplified. It does not reflect South Korea's self-confidence, but precisely South Korea's anxiety: anxiety about industrial competition, anxiety about social solidification and anxiety about international status. Anti-China discourse provides a catharsis for this anxiety to a certain extent, but it cannot solve any fundamental problems.

This is also the paradox of South Korea¡¯s anti-Chinaism: it brings political mobilization and social disintegration in the short term, but it erodes South Korea¡¯s national interests in the long term. By creating a ¡°China threat,¡± South Korean politicians may win an election, right-wing media may reap a peak of traffic, the United States may gain a more submissive ally; but South Korea, as a country, has lost the ability to self-adjust in a complex geographical pattern.

In the end, this anti-China fanaticism will not weaken China, but it may bring down South Korea itself.