When the shadow of the giant aircraft carrier gradually fades, a navy that pays more attention to efficiency and is more geographically appropriate is rising-this may not be the "standard configuration of a powerful country" in the traditional sense, but it is the optimal solution for Russia under the constraints of reality.

Reporter | Liu Zhaohui

In July, the Russian Navy announced that it was the only Russian aircraft carrier in service due to long-term maintenance difficulties and a severe shortage of funding, plus a major adjustment of the Shanghai military strategy.by KuznetsovAll repairs and modernization work on the Admiral "was forced to be suspended. It was mercilessly sealed up, and all the important equipment and machinery available on the ship were dismantled one by one for use in other ships, and its huge hull may face the tragic fate of being sold or dismantled and scrapped in the future.

This giant ship, which carries the glory and dream of the Russian navy, not only failed to be reborn from the ashes, but fell into the quagmire of accidents and became the "most expensive scrap metal in the world". This decision marks the complete end of the aircraft carrier legacy left to Russia from the Soviet era, and also puts the Russian navy's aircraft carrier power into a vacuum. Can the future Russian Navy still build aircraft carriers? Does it still need aircraft carriers?

Russia¡¯s only active aircraft carrier, the Navy Captain Kuznetsov, has been in service for many years.

The ill-fated "last generation" aircraft carrier

Since officially serving in the Russian Navy in 1991, the "General Kuznetsov" aircraft carrier has been ferocious and constantly struggling with all kinds of failures and accidents. Problems such as steam tank water pipes breakage, boiler leakage, turbine generator and diesel engine work lack of coordination, like the devil's curse, have continuously plagued the giant ship. In the period of 1995-2009, 10 serious accidents caused by power system failure and even caused the unfortunate casualties of three sailors.

Between November 2016 and January 2017, the ¡°General Kuznetsov Navy¡± hosted its first and only real battle ¡ª a mission on the battlefield in Syria to fight terrorist targets within Syria.

In the course of the sailing, the black smoke of the "General Kuznetsov Navy" roll-out was especially remarkable, which not only seriously affected its concealability, but also caused Western media to mock it, questioning the strength of the Russian Navy. Worse, during the execution of the mission, the interception on the ship suddenly broke, directly leading to the failure of a Su-33 and a MiG-29K aircraft carrier at landing, crashing into the Mediterranean Sea, the aircraft destroyed. The crash of the carrier not only caused huge property losses, but also severely hit the morale of the Russian Navy, but also exposed the carrier itself to serious problems in terms of technology, maintenance and logistics.

Following the end of the Syrian operation, the wounded "Kuznetsov Navy Captain" returned to Russia in 2017 and entered the shipyard of Mormannsk, beginning a long and difficult journey of repairs and modernization.

In October 2018, the PD-50 floating vessel carrying the aircraft carrier repair was disrupted due to an unknown cause, the sea water quickly flooded, more than 100 tons of oak hanged from the sky, a large hole of 200 square meters broke on the aircraft carrier deck, and the ship was severely damaged. This accident not only caused the aircraft carrier to "freeze" but also led to the crucial facility of the ship repair - the floating vessel sank, and the entire repair plan was completely disrupted, crushing more than a year to continue the repair work.

But bad luck did not let the "Admiral Kuznetsov" go. In December 2019, sparks generated by workers during welding accidentally ignited the fuel pipeline, and a fire quickly spread inside the aircraft carrier, burning a large number of key equipment. Although firefighters tried their best to put out the fire and avoid the tragic ending of the aircraft carrier being burned into an empty shell, the fire undoubtedly put the already difficult maintenance work into a desperate situation.

Since then, the maintenance project has basically come to a standstill, and the ship repair yard seems to have become a "gold-sucking black hole", constantly devouring huge sums of money, but there is no substantial repair progress of the aircraft carrier. The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 will make the fate of the "Admiral Kuznetsov" even worse. Russia's military expenditure began to tilt towards the Aerospace Forces and the Army, the status of the Navy was gradually marginalized, and the maintenance project of the "Admiral Kuznetsov" was also put in limbo.

During the long eight-year maintenance period, the "Admiral Kuznetsov" actually carried out effective maintenance only about 20% of the time, and most of the rest of the time was struggling with various accidents and problems. The maintenance work progressed slowly and came to a standstill many times. "Admiral Kuznetsov" not only failed to return to the sea, but became the biggest "ship repair joke" in the world. The sailors on the ship also faced embarrassing situations, and some sailors were even sent to the Russian-Ukrainian front line to join the land battlefield.

Russia's United Shipbuilding Group also has to admit that the ship's 40-year-old age has reached its physical limit, its power system is seriously aging, and its shipboard equipment is outdated. Continued maintenance is like "installing modern chips on antiques", which is not only costly, but also meaningful. Little. Avakyants, the former commander of the Pacific Fleet, was even more blunt: "Only the metal frame of this aircraft carrier is valuable, and dismantling is the only rational choice."

Historical gaps in aircraft carrier construction capabilities

The tragedy of "Admiral Kuznetsov" is no accident. It reflects the heavy dependence of the Russian aircraft carrier industry on the "Soviet heritage" and the difficulties faced by Russia in the field of aircraft carrier construction after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In fact, Russia has never really established an independent and complete aircraft carrier construction capability.

In 1982, the "Kuznetsov Navy Chief" began construction at the Nikolayev shipyard in Ukraine and was disembarked in 1985 as part of the "1143.5 Plan" of the Soviet Union. From the first-generation Moscow-class helicopter carrier to the second-generation Kiev-class cruiser, then to the third-generation Kuznetsov-class carrier, the shipyard on the Black Sea shore carrying the brilliant history of the Soviet aircraft carrier built by the "Kuznetsov Navy Chief" sister ship "Varyag" was also built here, although construction was forced to be interrupted due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but was subsequently purchased by China and transformed into the Liaoning ship and re-born.

The unfinished "Varyag" (left) and "Admiral Kuznetsov" on the coast of the Black Sea that year.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited much of the military heritage of the Soviet Union, and also took over the ¡°General Kuznetsov Navy¡± aircraft carrier, which was not yet fully built. But with the independence of Ukraine, Russia lost the core base of the aircraft carrier construction ¨C Nikolayev shipyard, 70% of the aircraft carrier support industry chain instantly broke. Those who once provided key parts, technology support enterprises and research institutions for the aircraft carrier, overnight divided into other countries, Russia wanted to build and maintain it, becoming extremely difficult. For example, the special steel materials needed for the aircraft carrier, advanced electronic equipment, etc., Russia had to re-search suppliers. No shipyard in Russia has the ability to build aircraft carrier independently, the lack of large ship

Almost 30 years later, Russia was unable to independently build a new aircraft carrier, relying only on the old facilities and limited technical strength to maintain and upgrade the "Kuznetsov Navy Chief". This "non-productive possession" led to the Russian Navy being in a passive situation in the operation of aircraft carriers. Without the addition of new aircraft carriers, the "Kuznetsov Navy Chief" long-term service, equipment is seriously aging, and the carrier forces are also in a continuous decline due to the lack of new equipment and continuous training.

The maintenance dilemma of this aircraft carrier is actually a microcosm of the decline of Russia's industrial capabilities, and the lack of aircraft carrier construction capabilities is only one aspect. Although Russia has put forward a number of new aircraft carrier construction plans after entering the 21st century, such as Storm-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and Varan-class light aircraft carrier, these seemingly beautiful plans can only stay in the PPT stage in the end. Due to various reasons such as technology, funds and talents, they have not been put into practice so far, and have become the bubble of Russian aircraft carrier dream.

The Indian Navy's Vikramatia aircraft carrier entered the Kochin shipyard to maintain upgrades.

Preparing for the development of drone aircraft carriers

For the Russian Navy, its strategy has shifted from its past "global presence" adjustment to "regional rejection", focusing more on defense operations in the near seas and critical waters. In this strategic context, continuing to invest a lot of resources in the development and maintenance of the aircraft carrier does not seem to be a wise choice.

In the Black Sea region, NATO's close surveillance has severely restricted Russian naval operations and made it difficult for aircraft carrier battle groups to operate freely; the Baltic Sea also faces similar difficulties, narrow waters and complex geopolitical environments, making it difficult for aircraft carriers to play their fist here. The Arctic Ocean is one of the Russian Navy's important areas of activity, but the extreme environment here poses many challenges for the deployment and operation of aircraft carriers.

As grigoriev, former chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, said, "Our aircraft carrier is spinning in its own bathtub, and it can't go out or fight". According to Russian media analysis, "When Russia no longer needs to show its presence in global hotspots, there will be little strategic value left of aircraft carriers". This strategic contraction is Russia's realistic choice in the current international situation, and it also means that the position of aircraft carriers in Russian naval strategy is no longer as important as it used to be.

The eight-year repair of the "Kuznetsov Navy Chief" cost an average of roughly 40 billion rubles a year, which is a heavy burden on Russia's finances. In contrast, the cost of construction of the new Russian nuclear submarines at the same time is only about one-third of the average annual maintenance costs of the "Kuznetsov Navy Chief". For Russia, under current combat needs, it spends a lot of money and resources on building andining aircraft carriers, rather than focusing on developing more cost-effective weapons such as missiles, submarines, in order to effective control and strategic deterrence of critical regions.

The Russian Navy has ranked missile destroyers as a priority development target.

The nuclear submarine force has also become the key development direction of the Russian Navy. In addition, with the continuous development of UAV technology, a new combat mode is quietly emerging-UAV mothership. Russia is also actively exploring this field. Inspired by Turkey's "Anadolu" and Japan's Izumo class, Russia is considering transforming the Type 23900 amphibious assault ship into a drone mothership. In addition to drones, unmanned boats are also one of the key directions for the development of the Russian Navy. Unmanned boats have the characteristics of small size, high speed, and good stealth, and can perform various tasks such as reconnaissance, patrol, anti-submarine, and anti-ship. The Russian Navy is developing a number of unmanned boats, some of which have entered the experimental stage.

23900 Russian ships.

The dismantling of the "General Kuznetsov Navy" is not the end point of the Russian Navy, but a new starting point for its strategic redesign. The Russian Navy's "de-aircraft dismantling" is essentially a precise positioning of the national power. When GDP is less than the US 1/10, when the shipbuilding industry degraded to the "escort club", giving up the vanity of the "superpower front", focusing on the construction of the "anti-intervention" operational system, is undoubtedly a pragmatic move.

¡°We don¡¯t need to be more muscular than the United States on the aircraft carrier deck, but rather to build an asymmetrical advantage in missile range, submarine depth and cyber-warfare dimensions.¡±The Russian Navy¡¯s strategic awareness is more valuable thanining an old aircraft carrier with black smoke ¨C after all, in modern naval warfare, effectiveness is always higher than symbolism, survival is the ultimate competitiveness.

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