On this day, 85 years ago, October 1, 1940 (September 1, 1940 in the lunar calendar), why was Mao Zedong very dissatisfied with the propaganda in the Hundred Regiments Battle? The common people lined the streets to welcome the soldiers who returned successfully from the Hundred Regiments War and wear glorious flowers to the combat heroes. On October 1, 1940, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Zuo Quan jointly called Nie Rongzhen, He Long, Liu Bocheng, etc. to decide that the second phase of the "Hundred Regiments War" ended. It was pointed out that the second stage of the "Hundred Regiments War" had lasted for ten days. The 120th Division had attacked Tongpu Road, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region had attacked Luanyuan area, and the 129th Division had attacked the Yu (She) Liao County area. Basically, victory has been achieved. After the battle, each regiment should appropriately gather its main force and carry out post-war reorganization. Summarize the experience and lessons of the Hundred Regiments War. Introduction to the Hundred Regiments War was the largest and longest battle between the Eighth Route Army of China and the Japanese Army in North China of China during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in China. Under the unified command of the headquarters, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, the 129th and 120th Divisions of the Eighth Route Army launched a campaign focusing on the attack on the Zhengtai Railway (Shijiazhuang to Taiyuan). On the third day of the launch of the battle, the Eighth Route Army had 105 regiments participating in the battle, so China called this the "Hundred Regiments Battle." Background of the War During the Anti-Japanese War, in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas, due to the growing development of anti-Japanese armed forces led by the Communist Party in North China, a strategic area where Japan invaded China, in the summer of 1939, the Japanese army concentrated some troops scattered in the Great Wall, North China, and Northeast China. Relying on railways, highways and other transportation lines, it continuously launched large-scale sweeps against the anti-Japanese forces in North China, and dug ditches and built fortresses in the wasteland in an attempt to hinder the attack of the anti-Japanese forces, implementing the implementation of "using railways as pillars and highways as chains. The "cage policy" of using strongholds as locks "is used to control and gradually shrink the anti-Japanese forces. However, during the two summers of 1939 and 1940, the distribution points of more than 300,000 Japanese troops and Manchukuo troops concentrated in North China continued to increase and their forces were scattered, which provided favorable conditions for the Eighth Route Army in North China to concentrate its superior forces to launch large-scale attacks. Battle situation In the second half of 1940, Peng Dehuai commanded a total of 105 regiments of more than 200,000 troops from the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army and the Jincha Military Region to launch an offensive campaign against the Japanese and Puppet troops in North China. In this battle, more than 1800 battles were held, more than 2900 strongholds were captured, and more than 45000 Japanese and puppet troops were wiped out. It dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese and puppet troops, inspired the fighting spirit of the war of resistance of China's military and civilians, and enhanced their confidence in victory. Since the winter of 1939, the Japanese army has used railways and highways as its pillars to carry out frequent sweeps of anti-Japanese base areas, and attempted to cut off the connections between strategic areas such as Taihang, Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, and implemented the so-called "cage policy" of "using railways as pillars, highways as chains, and bunkers as locks." The Eighth Route Army Headquarters decided to launch a traffic assault battle, focusing on attacking the Zhengtai Railway and the northern section of Tongpu Road, to deal a powerful blow to Japan's North China Front Army. Among the transportation lines in North China, the Zhengtai Railway occupies a very important position. It crosses the Taihang Mountains and is the link connecting the Pinghan and Tongpu railways. It is one of the important strategic transportation lines of the Japanese army in North China. The offensive campaign of the Eighth Route Army was first launched on the Zhengtai Railway, so it became known as the Zhengtai Road Campaign. Peng Dehuai in the Hundred Regiments War On July 22, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan, Deputy Chief of Staff, issued the "Campaign Preparation Order", stipulating that no less than 22 regiments should be used to attack the Zhengtai Railway on a large scale. At the same time, it is required to deploy appropriate troops to carry out extensive raids on the Tongpu, Pinghan, Jinpu, Beining, Deshi and other railways and some major highway lines in North China to coordinate with the assault battle on the Zhengtai Railway. On August 8, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Zuo Quan issued the "Campaign Action Order", stipulating that: the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region broke down the Shijiazhuang-Yangquan (excluding) section of the Zhengtai Railway; The 129th Division broke through the Yangquan (inclusive) to Yuci section of the Zhengtai Railway; the 120th Division broke through the Tongpu Railway and the Fenyang (Yang) Li (Shi) Highway north of Xin County, and placed heavy troops in the north and south of Yangqu to prevent the Japanese army from reinforcing the Zhengtai Railway. All ministries were required to recover some positions occupied by the Japanese army while breaking through communication lines. In these areas and communication lines, there are stationed all three divisions of the Japanese army, two regiments of each of the two divisions, all five independent mixed brigades and regiments, two brigades of each of the four independent mixed brigades and regiments, and two brigades of a cavalry brigade, totaling more than 200,000 people, as well as 150 aircraft and about 150,000 puppet troops. In the second half of 1940, Peng Dehuai commanded a total of 105 regiments of more than 200,000 troops from the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army and the Jincha Military Region to launch an offensive campaign against the Japanese and Puppet Army in North China. In this battle, more than 1800 battles were held, more than 2900 strongholds were captured, and more than 45000 Japanese and puppet troops were wiped out. It dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese and puppet troops, inspired the fighting spirit of the war of resistance of China's military and civilians, and enhanced their confidence in victory. According to the original regulations of the Eighth Route Army Headquarters, there were no less than 22 regiments participating in the war. However, after the launch of the battle, because the majority of commanders and fighters of the Eighth Route Army and the people in the anti-Japanese base areas hated the Japanese army's "cage policy" and were very enthusiastic to participate in the assault battle, various departments invested a large number of troops, including 39 regiments of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, 46 regiments of the 129th Division (including the 1st and 3rd columns of the Death Squad, etc.), and 20 regiments of the 120th Division (including the 2nd and 4th columns of the Death Squad, etc.), totaling more than 200,000 people in 105 regiments. There were also many local guerrillas and militiamen participated in the battle. (All of them may add up to more than 200 regiments.) When Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan listened to the battle situation report in the Operations Room of the Eighth Route Army Headquarters and learned that the actual number of troops participating in the battle had reached 105 regiments, Zuo Quan said excitedly: "Good! This is a Hundred Regiments Battle." Peng Dehuai said: "No matter how many regiments there are, just call this battle the Hundred Regiments Battle!" As a result, the Zhengtai Campaign developed into the Hundred Regiments Battle. In August 1940, the Eighth Route Army Command mobilized more than 100 regiments and launched a large-scale attack on the Japanese invaders on a front line of more than 2,000 kilometers in North China. They uprooted the enemy's bunkers and strongholds near the base areas and blew up railways, bridges, and highways, paralyzing the Japanese army's communication lines. This is the famous Hundred Regiments War. The Hundred Regiments Battle went through two active offensive stages and a counter-"mopping up" stage. The first stage of the Hundred Regiments War (August 20 to September 10). The Eighth Route Army launched a general attack on major transportation lines such as Zhengtai, Tongpu, Pinghan, and Jinpu, focusing on destroying the Zhengtai Railway. After 20 days of fighting, all scheduled plans were completed. The tracks, bridges, tunnels, water towers, stations, etc. of the Zhengtai Railway Line were all destroyed; the Pinghan, Tongpu (northern section), Shide, Beining railways and major highways were also cut off; various transportation lines in North China were paralyzed. The second stage (September 22 to early October). The task is to continue to expand the results and destroy enemy and puppet strongholds on both sides of the communication line and deep into the anti-Japanese base areas. During this period, our Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region mainly carried out the Battle of Lailing, the 129th Division mainly carried out the Battle of Yuliao, and the 120th Division mainly attacked Tongpu Road. In these battles, the Eighth Route Army dealt a heavy blow to the enemy; however, all the enemy strongholds that our army planned to uproot were not eradicated. In the third stage (October 6 to January 24 of the following year), the main task was to counterattack the retaliatory sweep of the Japanese and Puppet troops. During this period, the Eighth Route Army successively smashed the large-scale sweep of the Japanese and Puppet Army in Taihang, Taiyue, Pingxi, Beiyue, Northwest Shanxi and other anti-Japanese base areas. Note: The deadline for counting the results of the Hundred Regiments War announced by the Field Political Department of the Eighth Route Army is December 5. Statistics on results of the war. During the three and a half months from August 20 to December 5, the military and civilians behind our enemy lines carried out more than 1,800 battles of various sizes, killing and wounding more than 20,000 Japanese troops and more than 5,000 puppet troops. More than 280 Japanese troops and more than 18,000 puppet troops were captured; more than 900 miles of railways and 3,000 miles of highways were destroyed; 258 bridges and stations were destroyed; a large number of weapons and military supplies were seized. Judging from the number of annihilating the enemy (Japanese army), the Hundred Regiments 'War launched by the Eighth Route Army alone was no less than the results of the Winter Offensive against Japan launched by Chiang Kai-shek in 1939 when 71 divisions in ten war zones across the country were deployed. If the number of annihilating the puppet troops is included, the Eighth Route Army's results are still higher than the number of annihilating the enemy troops in the winter offensive, thus greatly improving the political status of the Eighth Route Army. Historical comment: The Hundred Regiments War was the largest battle in which China Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army took the initiative to attack the Japanese army during the Anti-Japanese War. It gave rise to the prestige of the anti-Japanese military and civilians behind enemy lines, inspired the confidence of the people of the country in winning the Anti-Japanese War, and effectively supported the Kuomintang in the frontal battlefield strategically. Extended reading: Mao Zedong was dissatisfied with the Propaganda of the Hundred Regiments War: Exposing Our Strength Extended reading: Mao Zedong was dissatisfied with the Propaganda of the Hundred Regiments War: Exposing Our Strength During the Anti-Japanese War, Mao Zedong affirmed the achievements of the Hundred Regiments War, but also criticized its existing problems. He was particularly dissatisfied with the publicity of the Hundred Regiments War. During the Yan 'an rectification movement, Mao Zedong criticized that such propaganda exposed our strength, caused the Japanese invaders to reassess our strength, and caused the enemy to concentrate his forces on attacking us. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek became more vigilant against us. You promoted that 100 regiments would join the war, and Chiang Kai-shek was very panicked. He has always had this mentality-he is afraid that we will expand our forces behind enemy lines. In his view, our development is a threat to him. In the autumn of 1940, the Eighth Route Army gathered more than 100 regiments in North China to carry out strategic offensive and counter-"mopping up" operations against the Japanese invading army, and started the famous "Hundred Regiments War." It delayed the Japanese invaders and delayed their plans to march south into the Pacific; domestically, it suppressed the countercurrent of compromise and surrender to a certain extent, enhanced the reputation of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army, and inspired the confidence of the military and civilians across the country in the victory of the War of Resistance.