On this day, 53 years ago, August 3, 1972 (June 24, 1972, the lunar calendar), Deng Xiaoping wrote a letter to Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping's letter to Mao Zedong on August 3, 1972 Chairman: The day before yesterday (August 1), for the fourth time, I listened to the criminal evidence of Lin Biao's anti-Party and counter-revolutionary group's conspiracy and rebellion, and the historical materials about Chen Boda's anti-communist, Trotskyist, traitor, secret agent, and revisionist elements. It made me feel even more that if it were not for the extremely huge mirror of the Cultural Revolution and the broad and in-depth mass movement that quickly revealed the true shapes of these evil ghosts and gods, Especially if the Chairman had not promptly discovered their reactionary nature and great harm from their world view, their political views and conspiracy activities, and quickly exposed them to broad daylight, if they had fully grasped the supreme power of the party and the country, not only would our socialist motherland become capitalist restoration, but our country would also fall back into a semi-colony, let alone how many people would have died. There is no doubt that at that time, the revolutionary people and the real Communists will eventually rise up and overthrow them and restore the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system, but how long will this go through painful historical repeats! Thinking about this, I really shudder. After overthrowing Liu Shaoqi's counter-revolutionary bourgeois headquarters, the great proletarian Cultural Revolution overthrew the counter-revolutionary clique Lin Biao and Chen Boda, once again eliminating the greatest danger for the party and the country. I couldn't help but cheer the great victory of the Cultural Revolution and the great victory of Mao Zedong Thought. Regarding Lin Biao and Chen Boda, I have no important information to expose, especially I know nothing about their history. I can only recall my usual feelings about them. Regarding Lin Biao, I used to think that he was very good at fighting. I didn't believe in a winning general. There were no generals who could not defeat. In fact, he did not win every battle, but I thought that he was a military expert after all. I also think his taciturn nature is a strength. In history, I know that he made two mistakes. One was during the Long March. He got together with Peng Dehuai and opposed Chairman Mao's leadership. He always boasted that he was opposed to Peng Dehuai, but at such a very difficult moment, he formed an alliance with Peng Dehuai and established a secret connection. Without the chairman's prestige and strong leadership, I wonder what would have happened. Once again, it was the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. This was also a serious political juncture. He again came forward to oppose the Chairman's extremely important political decision and refused to fight in North Korea. Supposedly, he was a more suitable candidate than Peng Dehuai, but he refused. In essence, he was afraid of the United States and did not believe that he would defeat the U.S. imperialists, and did not believe in his just stance and his strength. It was not until the 11th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that he said these two matters lightly in the air of self-criticism. After the liberation of the country, I gradually felt that he was a jealous and intolerant person from some things. I saw this from his attitude towards Luo Ronghuan, Liu Bocheng and other comrades. Comrade Liu Bocheng had shortcomings and mistakes in the teaching policy of the Military Academy, and criticism should be made. However, Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai jointly criticized Liu in a way that was not kind to others. Lin's speech at the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission was even more severe. They even said that Liu had no role in the Second Field Field, and it seemed that only I played a role there. I once said at that time that there were no commanders who could cooperate well. As a political commissar, I have no role to play (I remember saying it in the Standing Committee). Of course, Lin Biao is unhappy with my attitude. Comrade Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao are old comrades. By definition, they should be very good. Everyone knows that Comrade Luo Ronghuan is simple, sincere and kind. Luo has great prestige among cadres. Lin Biao once said that cadres in the four fields come to Luo when they need anything, but not him. I don't remember that in the 1950s, Comrade Luo Ronghuan pointed out that Lin Biao only emphasized the third chapters in his propaganda of Mao Zedong Thought, which was vulgarizing Mao Zedong Thought. Lin Biao was very unhappy and had a very bad relationship with Luo from then on. As for his relationship with He Long, everyone knows it. I made a mistake in handling Luo Ruiqing's problem. Before Luo Ruiqing's problem arose, I always believed that the relationship between Luo Ruiqing and Lin Biao would not be bad. I always thought that Luo was Lin's old subordinate and Lin recommended Luo to serve as chief executive. Therefore, when Lin Biao raised the issue in early 1966 (December 1965), the nature of Luo Ruiqing's problem was so serious that my feeling was very sudden. When Ye Qun told me how Luo Ruiqing opposed Lin Biao and attempted to seize power, he also included some words about how Luo despised me. I felt that they contained some personal things and were more or less of a surprise attack in the way, which somewhat affected my unforgivable mistakes in dealing with Luo's problems. As for Lin Biao holding high the great red flag of Mao Zedong Thought, it seems now that he did carry the red flag against it. It was a step to prepare for power, subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat, and restore capitalism. However, in the past, I have always believed that he caught it right, caught it well, and much better than me. One of my biggest mistakes in the past was not holding high the great red flag of Mao Zedong Thought. However, in the past, I have always disagreed with two points. First, Lin Biao only emphasized the third chapter and said many times that only the third chapter would be enough. I believe that Mao Zedong Thought comprehensively developed Marxism-Leninism in all fields. If only talking about the third chapter and not elaborating and applying Mao Zedong Thought in all fields, it would be tantamount to belittle Mao Zedong Thought and vulgarize Mao Zedong Thought; First, I always felt that Lin Biao's formulation separated Mao Zedong Thought from Marxism-Leninism, which also devalued the significance of Mao Zedong Thought, especially its role in the international communist movement and the anti-international revisionism movement. I learned this from the attitude of Comrade Albania, and I agreed to emphasize the role of Mao Zedong Thought in inheriting, defending and developing Marxism-Leninism. Regarding army building, I have always affirmed Lin Biao's role in this regard in the past. In the past, I only felt that he ignored the training of military technology and tactics when emphasizing the decisive factor of human beings. Lin Biao has said many times that as long as people are not afraid of death, they will win battles. This is correct and one-sided. During the Cultural Revolution, I saw the phrase "created by Chairman Mao and directly commanded by Vice Chairman Lin" and found it a bit dazzling. I only thought that this was a phrase to enhance Lin Biao's prestige and didn't dare to have other ideas. Now that my true colors are revealed, I suddenly understand it. I know nothing about Chen Boda's history, or even the Introduction to the Three People's Principles written in Yan 'an. My impression of Chen is that this person is very conceited, hypocritical, and has never criticized himself. He can write, and I have never heard him praise others for good things written. He is jealous of others who can write, such as Hu Qiaomu. His often mantra is "I am a scholar, I can't do it", which is his only self-criticism. He despised articles or documents that he had not participated in. If he made an incorrect opinion and was later criticized, he just stopped saying it and never heard him say that he made a mistake on that matter. For example, if he said no to the 70 Articles of Industry, what did he disagree with? I haven't heard him say it. I only know that he put forward two propositions in industry, one is to establish trusts, and the other is to establish a piece-rate wage system. We have experimented with establishing trusts, which means greater concentration of industry and is very contradictory to the policy of giving full play to local initiative. Implementing a piece-rate wage system (he specially compiled a survey material in Tianjin for this purpose) means further material incentives, which is definitely not as good as the system of "combining hourly wages with piece-rate wages". He won't talk about these two things anymore. Because he proposed that the seventy articles were not good, the central government appointed him to be responsible for amending them. Later, I urged him several times, but he never put them out, not knowing what he was up to. When writing a batch of articles criticizing Soviet revisionism, Chen Boda was never interested in participating because they were written in Comrade Kang Sheng's team. It was only when the 25th Article of the International Communist Movement was implemented that he became active because he was appointed to preside over the revision. In short, there are still many such things, but the details cannot be remembered. Chen Boda has not presided over any work for many years. I must forgive a person like him who holds a pen, so my impression of him is only average. As for his presiding over the Cultural Revolution, especially the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, it was only after listening to the Central Committee's documents that I realized that it was not surprising for a bad guy like him to reveal his past. The Chairman knows that Lin Biao and Chen Boda want to kill me and make me happy. If it weren't for the chairman's protection, I don't know what would have become. Together with the entire Party and the people of the country, I enthusiastically celebrate the great victory of destroying the Lin Biao Anti-Party and Counter-Revolutionary Clique after destroying Liu Shaoqi's Counter-Revolutionary Bourgeois Command! Regarding myself, my mistakes and sins, I reviewed what I had learned in my own self-statement written in June and July 1968. To this day, I still admit all the contents of my review, and once again affirm my guarantee to the central government that the verdict will never be reversed. One of the biggest mistakes in my history was that I should not have left the Red Seventh Army in early 1931. Although this behavior was organizationally legal, it was extremely wrong politically. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation, I basically implemented Chairman Mao's correct line, and of course I also made some individual mistakes. My other biggest mistake was that after I came to work in Beijing, especially after I became the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee, I made a series of mistakes, which led to the implementation of a counter-revolutionary bourgeois reactionary line with Liu Shaoqi. I did a very poor job as the general secretary. I did not ask the chairman for instructions and reports in a timely and frequent manner. I made the mistake of establishing an independent kingdom. During the difficult period of 1960 and 1961, I did not resist the evil tendencies of capitalism such as the three selves, one package and the four freedoms, and did not follow the chairman's instructions to do a good job in the basic construction of the third line. This made those who should not have been dismissed and postponed the construction of the third line of great strategic significance. In terms of industrial construction, the 70 Articles of Industry I presided over did not focus on politics and did not use the Chairman's Angang Iron and Steel Corporation Constitution as a guideline, so it was a wrong thing. Organizationally, I misjudged and trusted Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Yang Shangkun and other people. What is particularly important is that I have not held high the great red flag of Mao Zedong Thought for a long time. It was entirely appropriate for the Proletarian Cultural Revolution to expose me and criticize me. It was also a salvation for me. I fully support the Chairman's words: the Proletarian Cultural Revolution was completely necessary and timely. I have made many mistakes, and I explain them in my self-statement. I will not list them one by one here. The root cause of my mistake is that the bourgeois world outlook has not been fundamentally transformed and divorced from the masses and reality. In November last year (1971), I made a request for work in a letter to the Chairman. This is how I understand it: After making mistakes, I have completely divorced myself from work and social contact for more than five years and almost six years. I always want to have a chance to correct my mistakes from work and return to the chairman's proletarian revolutionary line. I fully know that a person like me who has made great mistakes and sins and has been criticized in society can no longer win the trust of the masses or do any important work. However, I feel that I am in good health. Although I am sixty-eight years old, I can still do some technical work (such as investigation and research work), and I can still work for the party and the people for seven to eight years in order to make up for my mistakes. I have no other requests. I am waiting for the instructions of the Chairman and the Central Committee. I sincerely wish Chairman a long life! Deng Xiaoping's comment on August 3, 1972: The rolling Yangtze River passes eastward, and the waves wash away heroes