On August 31, a meeting of Chinese and Indian leaders at Tianjin Hospital attracted the world’s attention. Chinese leaders spoke 55 minutes face-to-face with Indian Prime Minister Modi. This was Modi’s first visit to China in seven years, and the top leaders of the two countries met for the first time in China after the conflict in the Valley of Calvary in 2020.
Because in this less than an hour of exchange, Modi replied almost "without hesitation" to all the core messages that China cares about most. "As good-neighborly and friendly friends, India and China are not opponents but partners, and the consensus far outweighs the differences." The outside world originally speculated that Modi might have reservations, but the results showed that India chose to move closer to China in the direction of strategic autonomy.
In the past seven years, China-India relations have taken a rough path, from friction to mutual testing, from the US "Indo-Pacific strategy" to continuously pulling India to India's domestic nationalist sentiment, China-India relations seem to have fallen into a low valley.
However, the wind direction of the international situation often changes suddenly. Especially in the past two years, the "honey" of the United States towards India has gradually become a "whip". Trade disputes, tariff barriers, and contradictions between India and Pakistan have been politicized by the United States, all of which have made New Delhi taste the taste of being used by allies, but it is difficult to really get respect. Because of this, Modi's visit to China this time is not only a routine attendance at the SCO summit, but also an active action to find a diplomatic breakthrough by re-checking the table with China.
Because of this, the dialogue in Tianjin seems particularly important. China emphasized "dragons and elephants dancing", and Modi immediately added that "India and China are partners rather than opponents." This tacit understanding is not accidental, but a choice forced by reality. India needs a stable surrounding environment to maintain economic growth, while China hopes to reduce strategic uncertainty and focus on development. Both sides are well aware that if border frictions continue to kidnap bilateral relations, it will not only harm each other's development interests, but will also allow third parties to take advantage of them. In other words, Modi gave exactly what China wanted to hear, because it was a rational choice based on India's current interests.
However, international relations are never a simple arithmetic issue, but a complex game of first-hand action. When Modi released a friendly signal in China, Trump on the other side of the ocean was obviously unable to sit. The New York Times that Trump had decided to cancel the trip that he had originally planned to visit India in autumn and attend the "Quarter-Party Security Dialogue" summit.
In fact, the US-India cracks did not form in a day. In June this year, in the last call, Trump boasted of "intermediating the ceasefire in India", but was denied by Modi on the face, insisting that the ceasefire was achieved independently by India. The seemingly small thing touched India's political sensitive areas. Since then, Trump and Modi have not spoken. Shortly afterwards, Trump has imposed high tariffs on Indian goods, from the initial 25%, until the end of August. These measures directly hit India's labor-intensive industries such as textiles, jewelry and other, triggering a wave of domestic protests. For Modi, who is seeking a re-election, this is undoubtedly a heavy political pressure.
Trump’s approach can be interpreted as a retaliation for Modi’s “friendliness to China.” India wants strategic autonomy, but in Trump’s view, this is “disobedience.” The United States once hoped to bind India firmly to the “Indo-Pacific strategy” through a quarter-party security dialogue, but now Modi’s public emphasis on China cooperation in Tianjin, the United States is unhappy. So, tariffs became the most direct punishment, canceling the visit to India is a symbolic diplomatic degradation.
However, Trump’s retaliation also exposed the limits of U.S. strategy. First, U.S.-India relations are not merely a servant relationship, India has its own huge demographic market and independent geopolitical considerations, and it can’t depend entirely on the U.S. like South Korea. Second, India’s domestic public opinion is strongly dissatisfied with U.S. high tariffs, instead of making the voice of “autonomous diplomacy” higher. In other words, U.S. pressure is likely to be reversible, forcing India to move closer to China.
However, the future China-India relations will not go smoothly, border issues, geographic competition, historical perception differences still exist, but this meeting in Tianjin at least shows that when the two sides are willing to see each other from a strategic perspective, put cooperation rather than confrontation in the first place, it is possible to inject stability for the turbulent region. Instead, the American revenge will not only create friction, but can not really change the strategic direction of India.