On September 3, 2025, Beijing's Tiananmen Square is about to usher in a high-profile event-the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War.
This event is not only a tribute to history, but also an important stage for international diplomacy. With the official announcement of the list of foreign guests, all the leaders of 26 countries appeared, among which the names of three "special guests" attracted global attention: Kim Jong Un, the top leader of North Korea, Min Aung Hlaing, acting president of Myanmar, and Yukio Hatoyama, former Japanese Prime Minister.
Kim Jong Un: "Ice and Fire" in China-North Korea Relations
Kim Jong-un’s name appeared on the 93rd Parade list and almost everyone was surprised. As the highest leader of North Korea, he has long been seen as a key role on China’s Northeast Asian strategic chessboard.
The invitation to attend the parade and the second place (after Russian President Putin) is obviously not a coincidence. China's treatment of Kim Jong-un sends a clear signal that China's relations are undergoing an "escalation".
From a historical perspective, the relationship between China and North Korea can be traced back to the period of the Anti-Japanese War. In the 1930s, the Korean volunteer army fought against the Japanese army in northeast China, and the Eighth Route Army led by the Chinese Communist Party also repeatedly supported the Korean anti-Japanese forces. Today, Kim Jong-un's high-profile attendance is both a tribute to that history and a response to the current geopolitical landscape.
North Korea's hardline stance on the nuclear issue in recent years, as well as tensions with the United States and South Korea, have made cooperation between China and North Korea particularly important. Although there was speculation that Sino-North Korea relations had "cooled" due to North Korea's shift towards Russia and North Korea trade cooperation, Kim Jong-un's visit undoubtedly shattered such rumors.
What is more interesting is whether Kim Jong-un will participate in the "foreign military phalanx" in the military parade. During the military parade on September 3rd in 2015, Russia, Kazakhstan and other countries sent teams, but North Korea did not participate at that time.
Whether there will be any changes this time will become an important vane for observing the military interaction between China and the DPRK. If the DPRK delegation appears, it means that the cooperation between the two countries has gone deep into the military field from the diplomatic level, which will have a self-evident impact on the situation in East Asia.
Myanmar’s political ‘grey zone’
The presence of Myanmar’s President-in-Chief, Minoanne, reminds us of the country’s complex political situation.Minoanne’s visit, as a representative of the Myanmar military, was not merely a political ceremony, but implicated in multiple intentions.
After the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, Western countries imposed severe sanctions on it, while China has always emphasized its stance of "non-interference in internal affairs." This invitation to Min Aung Laing is not only China's acquiescence to the Myanmar military, but also a maintenance of the internal balance of ASEAN.
Myanmar is located at a key node of the "Belt and Road" initiative, especially the construction of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which is directly related to the energy security and trade channel of southwestern China. Min Aung Lai's visit may inject new impetus into China-Myanmar cooperation.
In the past, the European Union and the United States have repeatedly called on China to put pressure on the Myanmar military, and China’s “high-tone invitation” is undoubtedly a response to this pressure.
From a more macro perspective, Minonley’s presence also reflects China’s pragmatic style in Southeast Asia diplomacy. Though the Myanmar military is controversial, China still chooses to cooperate with them, and this “practical” strategy is rare in regional diplomacy. After all, for China, ensuring stability and economic cooperation at the border between China and Myanmar is a priority far above the moral judgment of Myanmar’s political situation.
Yukio Hatoyama: "A clear stream" in Japanese politics
If the presence of Kim Jong Un and Min Aung Rae reflects the "hard power" of China's diplomacy, then Yukio Hatoyama's visit demonstrates China's clever use of "soft power." As a former Japanese prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama is a rare "anti-war faction" in Japanese politics.
He not only publicly knelt down to apologize, but also repeatedly criticized the Japanese government's evasive attitude towards historical issues. Being invited to participate in the 1993 military parade is not only a recognition of Hatoyama's personal position, but also a tentative move to "break the ice" in Sino-Japanese relations.
The Japanese government's attitude towards the September 3rd military parade has been ambiguous. Although the Japanese foreign ministry did not explicitly boycott it, the official attendance was not sent. By contrast, the visit of Yukio Hatoyama was particularly "unconventional". His speech emphasized that "true patriotism lies in not avoiding historical facts". This statement will undoubtedly touch the sensitive nerves in Japan.
For China, the invitation to Xi Jinping is both a sort of counterbalance against Japan’s right-wing forces and the possibility of showing the international community the “non-zero-sum game” of China-Japan relations.
It is worth noting that the visit of Zhengzhou by Zhengzhou may also have a positive impact on civil relations between the two countries. Despite the fact that official relations between the two countries have been stalled due to historical issues and territorial disputes, civil exchanges have not been interrupted. The appearance of Zhengzhou may inject a "temperature" into the relations between the two countries, especially in the younger generation, the idea of peace and cooperation.
After the publication of the list of foreign visitors to the 1993 parade, the international public opinion rapidly diverged. Supporters argue that China has shown the widespread and inclusive nature of its “friend circle” by inviting multinational leaders. Opponents question whether this “diplomatic show” masks the controversial behavior of certain countries.
The Japanese media reacted furiously to Mr. Hatoyama's visit, with some rightwing media accusing him of "betraying Japan" but some rational voices arguing that Mr. Hatoyama's actions would help Japan rethink its history.
South Korea was embarrassed by President Lee Jae-myung's refusal to attend. Li Zaiming's choice to visit the United States instead of participating in the 1993 military parade was interpreted as a "cold treatment" of China. However, this choice does not seem to bring the expected results-instead, North Korea took the opportunity to get closer to China, and South Korea's sense of diplomatic isolation was further intensified.
The charm of the East.
While Trump had "other arrangements" on the parade day, the White House did not publicly criticize China's invitation list. Analysts believe that the United States is currently more concerned with its own domestic issues and is temporarily unable to respond to China's "diplomatic offensive".
However, a report from the US think tank CSIS has warned that China's high-level interaction with the DPRK could "re-shape the geopolitical pattern of East Asia", which may indicate that the future U.S.-China game in the Asia-Pacific region will be more intense.
The 93rd military parade is not only a commemoration of history, but also a layout for the future. The visits of Kim Jong Un, Min Aung Rai and Yukio Hatoyama respectively represent China's different strategic considerations in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Japan-South Korea relations. These seemingly independent incidents actually weave a complex diplomatic picture.
For North Korea, Kim Jong Un’s high-profile debut was a harvest of “diplomatic dividends”. Through close interaction with China and Russia, North Korea has sought more initiative in the regional game. However, whether this cooperation will continue depends on North Korea’s ability to make substantial concessions on the nuclear issue.
The situation in Burma is even more subtle.Minonley's visit may stabilize China-Myanmar cooperation in the short term, but in the long run, Western pressure remains a variable.China needs to find a balance between safeguarding its own interests and avoiding radical opposition with the West.
As for Sino-Japanese relations, Mr. Hatoyama's visit may be just a "sideshow". A real breakthrough in the relationship between the two countries still requires the two sides to find common ground on historical issues and economic cooperation. But it is undeniable that China has shown diplomatic flexibility by "inviting outliers".
The year 2025 is set to become an iconic event on the international political stage.The visit of Kim Jong-un, Min Hoon-Lee and Zhou Jianf is not only a demonstration of diplomatic ceremonies, but also a “strategic performance” of China in a complex international environment, and for the average audience, this “Oriental narrative” is just beginning.
Source of information:
The September 3rd military parade will be attended by 26 foreign heads of state and government, including Putin and Kim Jong-un.
2025-08-28 10:29 · direct news
Chinese officials announced: Japan's former prime minister Shenyang Von Dzhiv participated in the 93rd parade
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