Preliminary
Not long ago, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced the attendance list of leaders of various countries at the upcoming SCO summit in Tianjin, including the name of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Many observers thought that this was a signal that India continued to pressure the United States and finally turned to Asia to seek relief.
However, just before Modi was about to leave for China, the Indian government not only deleted the key words of the previous foreign minister's clear statement that "Taiwan is part of China," but also tested the Agni-5 long-range missile in a high-profile manner, deliberately exaggerating its range covers the entire territory of China.
So what is the logic behind this series of moves in India, and what exactly does it want to do?
India's "two-sided approach"
If we put Modi's recent changes in his itinerary in an international context, it is easy to understand the contradictions.
The past few months have seen a series of cracks in India's relationship with the United States, with the Trump administration slapping tariffs and even punitive measures on Indian steel and aluminum products, citing "unfair trade".
This pressure puts the Indian economy under little pressure.
Therefore, of course, the Modi government has to look for new cooperation and market channels, and the potential of the SCO is suddenly highlighted.
For this reason, when Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India not long ago, China and India quickly reached a "ten-point consensus", which included a wide range of issues such as the resumption of direct flights, border dialogue and economic cooperation.
Especially in China's briefing, Indian Foreign Minister Sujarsen's public statement at that time-"Taiwan is part of China"-was regarded by the outside world as a very landmark signal of goodwill.
This sentence is not only a diplomatic term, but also represents a certain degree of change in India's attitude. The outside world had generally expected that this would promote a phased relaxation in China-India relations.
However, just as the summit was about to be held, India quickly "changed its tune", deleting this sensitive and critical sentence from the official briefing, and claimed that its position had not changed.
Meanwhile, the Indian military announced the test of the Fire-5 missile, emphasizing its 5,000-kilometre range covering the entire territory of China.
These two things, put together, are not just a question of diplomatic skill, but nakedly show India's complex mentality.
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This contradictory statement of “cooperate but fear to lose” is actually behind India’s own deep logic.
The first is the diplomatic thinking that puts pragmatism first. India does not really want to completely tilt to any side. What it emphasizes is "great power balance."
When the US raises the tariff stick, it will make overtures to China to ease the pressure; when there is a border friction in Sino-Indian relations, it will immediately return to the tough tone of "playing up the Chinese threat" and divert domestic attention.
The Modi government likes to use this careful weighing method to seek practical interests. For example, his recent intensive visits to Japan and other Asian countries to seek investment cooperation are a concrete manifestation of this multi-party balance.
Second, the issue of border legacy has made it difficult for India to completely change its hardships with China.
To put it bluntly, the foundation of mutual trust between China and India has always been insufficient. Whether it is inheriting the McMahon Line during the colonial period, continuously promoting military and civilian construction in southern Tibet, or even high-level visits, these actions are fundamentally in conflict with China's core propositions.
On the one hand, India needs China to provide economic cooperation to solve its urgent needs, but on the other hand, it dare not show any signs of "softness" on territorial and security topics. This also doomed it to remain wavering in diplomatic rhetoric.
More importantly, India’s current high unemployment rate, high inflationary pressures, and the Kashmir issue are still fermenting, contradictions that keep Modi’s government bound.
In this situation, any cooperative action against China without a matching "tough show" is easily criticized by the domestic opposition as "showing weakness or betraying the country."
Therefore, even when it comes to the SCO summit, India must calm the public opinion through missile tests and blurring Taiwan’s expression.
It is precisely because of these calculations that India continues to struggle between the temptation of economic interests and the persistence of security politics, ultimately forming today's "two faces" in the eyes of the outside world.
So, since India’s contradictory attitude is a structural problem, how should China respond?
The Way Out of Sino-Indian Relations
For China-India relations, we naturally need to do a little, that is, the bottom line cannot be shaken!
The Taiwan issue is a core national interest of China, and any country that makes small moves or makes vague statements will be firmly opposed by China.
The one-China principle cannot be undermined, no matter who, no matter what reason, there is no room for speculation on this issue, which must make India really clear.
But on the other hand, China does not need to deny all cooperation space just because of India's small speculation.
As an important mechanism covering most parts of Europe and Asia, the SCO not only has the core value of security cooperation, but also begins to form a substantive platform at the economic, financial and energy levels.
Both the Central Asian markets and joint infrastructure investments provide India with huge growth opportunities.
For New Delhi, the economic losses caused by missing the opportunity to cooperate with China will sooner or later be recognized by the country's elite.
Therefore, this summit in Tianjin is a crucial window for India.
It can take the opportunity to show its cooperative attitude and seek economic opportunities; It may also lose its already limited international credibility because of continued speculation and being seen through by partners.
For China, we don't have to rush to change anything. As long as we continue to promote substantive agendas such as security, finance, and energy at the summit, demonstrating the certainty of cooperation, India will clearly weigh its own interests.
reference
Observers Network: "Yao Long Mei: Before visiting China, Modi's "attention" needs to pay attention" August 29, 2025
Foreign Ministry: Some people in India attempt to undermine China's sovereignty on the Taiwan issue, China is seriously concerned, August 21, 2025